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ABSTRACT
One might argue real estate is entering a period where technological innovations have greater
impact on investment returns than conventional metrics related to the overall economy. While this
has already been demonstrated by e-commerce disrupting the retail and logistics landscape,
industry leaders are now starting to become more and more attentive to mobility related
implications, resulting from the recent advent of ride-hailing providers like Uber, Lyft, and Didi.
Broad literature, generated over the past decades and applying widely recognized econometric
concepts, emphasizes the significance of public transport access for residential real estate values.
More recently, claims arose that the value of proximity to public transport is being challenged by
ride-hailing, serving as a substitute for rail and bus services. While the existence of a certain
substitution effect is supported and documented by academic studies, research about its impact on
real estate is rare.
This thesis analyzes the value change of public transport access over time, by applying a hedonic
regression model to a sample of 257,100 residential real estate transactions which have taken place
in New York City between January 2005 and June 2018. The distance between each individual
home and the closest of 550 heavy rail transit stops is used to determine the value of proximity to
public transport in these transactions. Contrary to anecdotal claims and economic theory, the
results of this analysis suggest that the value of proximity, i.e. rent gradients towards heavy rail
transit stops, increases over the observed time period, especially since the emergence of Uber and
within walking distance (0.5 miles) from transit access points.
Since mobility innovation's long-term effects might not be in line with short-term implications
and notable regional variances might exist, the thesis recommends ongoing analysis of the subject
matter and expanding the research from New York City to various markets with different urban
shapes, transportation modes, and demographics.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Andrea Chegut
Title: Research Scientist, Center for Real Estate
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To my mother, my grandparents, Ingrid, and to my friends Markus, Michael, and Rahul who
probably have no idea that I only made it to MIT because of their continuous support.
To my incredible sister, Susanne, whose presence back home gave me the invaluable reassuring
certainty that the family is in good hands.
To Professor David Geltner and Professor William Wheaton whose peerless genius radiates so
strongly that it made me perceive real estate from entirely new perspectives.
To Professor Nori Gerardo Lietz and Professor John Macomber who became true inspirations and
role models for life and business.
To my brilliant thesis advisor, Dr. Andrea Chegut, whose contagious enthusiasm triggered my
transformation from a technology sceptic to an evangelist.
To MKG. The value of our friendship made my investment in this degree NPV-positive from day
one.
Finally, to everyone else at MIT and Harvard who made the past twelve months some of the most
delightful times of my life.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 3
List of Figures and Tables 6
List of Abbreviations 8
1. Introduction 10
2. Innovation in Mobility 14
2.1 Mobility in the 20th Century 14
2.1.1 The Rise of the Automobile Shaping Urban Landscapes 14
2.1.2 Public Transportation and its impact on Land Values 16
2.2 Mobility in the 21st Century 18
2.2.1 Car Sharing 18
2.2.2 Ride Hailing 19
2.2.3 Autonomous Vehicles as an Accelerator for Ride Hailing 21
2.3 Mobility Summary 22
3. Real Estate and Location 25
3.1 Location as Key-Driver for Investment Decisions 25
3.1.1 Risk and Return Related Location Considerations 25
3.1.2 Diversification Related Location Considerations 26
3.2 Economic Perspective on Location Value 28
3.2.1 The Classical Monocentric City Model 28
3.2.2 The Polycentric City Model 29
3.2.2 Other Approaches Explaining Location Value 31
3.3 Location Value Summary 32
4. Applied Economics: Forming a Hypothesis 33
4.1 Derivations from the (Mono-)Centric Framework 33
4.2 The LVU Concept and its Application in Land Value Capture 36
5. Empirical Evidence: Price Dynamics in New York City 37
5.1 Base Data and Descriptive Statistics 37
5.2 Geo Mapping Proximity Zones 40
5.3 Methodology 43
4
5.4 Results 44
6. Concluding Remarks 54
6.1 Review of Results in Context with the (Mono-)Centric Framework 54
6.2 Demand and Supply in Flux 56
6.3 Policy and Investment Implications 59
References 61
Appendix 66
5
Figure 1:
Table 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure 5:
Figure 6:
Table 2:
Figure 7:
Figure 8:
Figure 9:
Figure 10:
Table 3:
Figure 11:
Table 4:
Figure 12:
Figure 13:
Figure 14:
Figure 15:
Figure 16:
Figure 17:
Table 5:
Table 6:
Table 7:
Table 8:
Table 9:
Table 10:
Table 11:
Table 12:
6
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
LVU Coefficients Across American Cities
Average Mobility Expenses and Speed for Different Transport Modes
Washington Post Ad - Location, Location, Location
Cross-Section of the Monocentric City Model
Cross-Section of the Polycentric City Model
Technology Improvement in a Monocentric City - Scenario 1
Technology Improvement in a Monocentric City - Scenario 2
Descriptive Statistics
Sale Year Distribution
NYC ArcGIS Geo Mapping Process
NYC ArcGIS Transaction and Mobility Map
Zone Distribution
Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Quartic Distance
Distance Coefficients with and without Control for Neighborhoods
Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
Multivariate Zone Coefficients 1/2
Multivariate Zone Coefficients 2/2
Monocentric City Model and Multivariate Zone Coefficients 1/2
Monocentric City Model and Multivariate Zone Coefficients 2/2
New York City Ridership and Population
Licensed Drivers as a Percentage of their Age Group Population
Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
Regression Output New York City 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
Regression Output New York City 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
Regression Output New York City 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
Regression Output Manhattan 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
Regression Output Manhattan 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
Regression Output Manhattan 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
Regression Output Manhattan 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
17
22
25
28
30
34
35
39
40
41
42
43
46
47
48
50
52
54
55
56
57
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
Table 13: Regression Output Bronx 2005-2018 - Distance Zones 74
Table 14: Regression Output Bronx 2015-2018 - Distance Zones 75
Table 15: Regression Output Bronx 2010-2014 - Distance Zones 76
Table 16: Regression Output Bronx 2005-2009 - Distance Zones 77
Table 17: Regression Output Brooklyn 2005-2018 - Distance Zones 78
Table 18: Regression Output Brooklyn 2015-2018 - Distance Zones 79
Table 19: Regression Output Brooklyn 2010-2014 - Distance Zones 80
Table 20: Regression Output Brooklyn 2005-2009 - Distance Zones 81
Table 21: Regression Output Queens 2005-2018 - Distance Zones 82
Table 22: Regression Output Queens 2015-2018 - Distance Zones 83
Table 23: Regression Output Queens 2010-2014 - Distance Zones 84
Table 24: Regression Output Queens 2005-2009 - Distance Zones 85
Table 25: Regression Output Staten Island 2005-2018 - Distance Zones 86
Table 26: Regression Output Staten Island 2015-2018 - Distance Zones 87
Table 27: Regression Output Staten Island 2010-2014 - Distance Zones 88
Table 28: Regression Output Staten Island 2005-2009 - Distance Zones 89
7
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AR Agricultural Rent
AV Autonomous Vehicle
BRT Bus Rapid Transit
CR Construction Rent
CS Car Sharing
CBD Central Business District
CRT Commuter Rail Transit
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
et al. Et alia
HRT Heavy Rail Transit
i.e. Id Est
LR Location Rent
LVC Land Value Capture
LVU Land Value Uplift
LRT Light Rail Transit
NACTO National Association of City Transportation Officials
MCM Monocentric City Model
onl. Online Source
PCM Polycentric City Model
REIT Real Estate Investment Trust
REPE Real Estate Private Equity
RH Ride-hailing
6 Standard Deviation
TIF Tax Increment Financing
8
page intentionally left blank ~
9
1. INTRODUCTION
One might argue real estate is entering a period where technological disruptions have greater
impact on investment returns than conventional metrics related to the overall economy. As one
example of changing dynamics between real estate performance and underlying macro-market
fundamentals, CBRE documented in the last quarter of 2017 that absorption for US retail space
went negative in a non-recession period for the first time in documented history, which happens
to be highly correlated with the disruptive continuous growth of e-commerce (Acton, 2018). It
appears that technological change abounds, and another area where new technology may
substantially influence real estate in the short- to medium-term future is mobility, namely the rise
of alternative affordable mobility solutions, such as ride-hailing (RH) along with the emergence
of autonomous vehicles (AVs).
How and to which extent RH, potentially accelerated by the advent of the AV, is going to impact
real estate is a question that has yet to be answered. In any case, this relatively new form of door-
to-door mobility is growing massively. RH market penetration rates are already reaching levels
around 20% across major countries like China and the USA, revenues are expected to double
within the next four years (Statista, 2018), and with a valuation of US$ 68 billion, the industry's
market leader Uber is the most valuable venture-backed startup company worldwide (Huston,
2017). RH and its staggering growth is expected to have tremendous impact on people's mobility
behavior and even on the structure of urban settings. Therefore, income dynamics for most real
estate product types might be profoundly challenged (Kiger, 2017).
The transportation revolution is the single biggest game changer for real estate
since the arrival of the auto itself."
Dave Bragg, Managing Director of Green Street Advisors, stated at the 2016 Urban Land Institute
(ULI) Fall Conference in Dallas, before concluding:
, There is impactfor every single asset " (Blackwell, 2016).
Talking about AVs one year later in Los Angeles, Fifth Wall's co-founder and managing partner
Brad Greiwe found even more dramatic words:
10
There is a meteor coming to the real estate industry, and it is going to create and
destroy more value than anything we have ever seen" (Kiger, 2017).
As for any other asset class, when acquiring real estate, professional investors follow a rigid due
diligence process. Besides technical, environmental, legal, and tax due diligence, financial
feasibility analysis and underwriting is paramount for thoroughly understanding both,
development of new assets and investment in existing properties. Investment professionals are
trained in justifying financial underwriting inputs with macro and micro-factors, such as economic
outlook, income stability and dynamics, or location- and asset-related aspects. However, when it
comes to underwriting highly uncertain innovation-related implications, the process becomes
eminently challenging.
As an example for early adoption of technology related consequences in real estate investment,
Prologis co-founder and CEO, Hamid Moghadam, was a first-mover in recognizing the power of
e-commerce. He started divesting the firm's retail portfolio in the early 2000s in order to set free
capital to invest in logistics assets and become a global leader in operation, ownership, and
development of industrial real estate (Moslehi, 2010). Today, major retail REITs are struggling,
facing increasing vacancy rates and tenant defaults in line with growing online competition
(Thomas, 2017). As a result, e-commerce related reflections are now being widely applied when
it comes to transacting and developing retail real estate. Innovative mobility solutions may be
another disruptor. However, they are a more recent phenomenon and implications on real estate
values are not as easily predictable as they were for the emergence of e-commerce.
While estimations vary about when exactly AVs are going to enter and penetrate the mass market,
there are hardly any doubts about that it will happen. In the current time period, highly affordable
car sharing and RH applications are already seen to change behavioral patterns of door-to-door
transportation in many cities around the globe. This thesis' goal is to provide a first piece of
guidance to prepare for the challenges ahead related to the potentially biggest disruption of real
estate since the mass commercialization of the internal combustion engine powered automobile in
the early 2 0 th century.
Of course, if a service like RH would become a substitute for public transportation, this would not
only lead to far reaching implications for home owners and real estate investors. Also policymakers
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working on public transportation improvements would have to entirely alter their argumentation
strategies. Public transport access points becoming less and less important for real estate value and
attractiveness would mean that widely used land value capture models and other public policy
tools become less applicable, if not completely obsolete. More provokingly, questions can be asked
about the need for public transport at all. Road capacity challenges aside, who needs urban
railways, if RH provides better service for lower fares?
To explore these questions, this thesis discusses potential implications resulting from RH from a
real estate perspective. It analyzes the value change of public transport access over time, by
applying a hedonic regression model to a sample of 257,100 residential real estate transactions for
New York City between January 2005 and June 2018. The distance between each individual home
and the closest of 550 heavy rail transit stops is used to determine the value of proximity to public
transport in these transactions.
Contrary to anecdotal claims, the results of this analysis suggest that the value of proximity, i.e.
rent gradients towards heavy rail transit stops, increases over the observed time period, especially
since the emergence of Uber and within walking distance (0.5 miles) from transit access points.
The findings are relevant for real estate investors and government officials alike. Firstly,
understanding mobility related price dynamics and developing informed conclusions can be crucial
for an investment's return. Secondly, changes in mobility behavior and the value of public
transport access will require ongoing reassessment to include public infrastructure financing.
As a first step, an overview of the history, present, and expected future of mobility is provided.
The first chapter after the introduction will thereby discuss how the emergence of the automobile
shaped cities in the 20th century and how innovative mobility solutions can have as substantial
impacts on the built environment, and therefore on real estate price dynamics, in the future.
Subsequently, the thesis will briefly outline why location factors are paramount in determining
real estate values and influencing investment decisions. Standard econometric concepts, such as
the Mono- and Polycentric City Model, will be introduced in order to systematically explain how
location factors influence real estate values. The fourth chapter will apply previously introduced
concepts in order to obtain a better understanding of potential directions, dimensions, and time-
horizons of market forces arising from mobility innovations. Chapter 5 will analyze whether
effects of RH on real estate values can already be observed in the real world. To enable this
12
analysis, the thesis uses a hedonic regression model to analyze New York City real estate
transaction data provided by the US Department of Finance. It will thereby try to identify and
isolate effects in different submarkets of New York. In Chapter 6, the thesis concludes with a
discussion of the results.
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2. INNOVATION IN MOBILITY
"We have a historic opportunity to reclaim the street and correct the mistakes of a century of
urban planning," (NACTO, 2017)
says Chair Principal at Bloomberg Associates and NACTO Executive Board Member Janette
Sadik-Khan, addressing the significant impact cars have on the built environment since they
entered the mass-market in the early 2 0 th century. The automobile's impact on the shape of today's
urban settings is widely recognized among urban planners and other real estate professionals. Also,
there appears to be a consensual expectation that innovation in mobility, with RH and AVs on its
forefront, has the potential to re-shape the cities we are living in today. This section will summarize
the development of individual and mass mobility in the last 100 years, before providing
information about the current status of AV technology and RH and car sharing services. Based on
what has been learned from the history of mobility, the section will be concluded by a discussion
about which innovations are more or less likely to have an impact on real estate.
2.1 Mobility in the 20th Century
When it comes to urban planning and development, much of the 2 0 th century was characterized by
the diffusion of the automobile. This section will explain how the automobile and other mobility
innovations impacted and shaped urban areas in this time.
2.1.1 The Rise of the Automobile Shaping Urban Landscapes
"The motor vehicle [...] has a voracious appetite for land" (Melosi, 2010)
Even though the first prototype capable of transporting humans was already invented in 1769, it
took until the early years of the 2 0 th century, that the mass production of automobiles took off
(Eckermann, 2001).
Once cars were introduced to the mass-market, urban planning started to adjust to the needs of a
newly mobilized population. Historians even began classifying city development in terms of
mobility, establishing the three-staged chronology
- Walking City (pre-1880),
- Streetcar City (1880-1920), and
14
Automobile City (post-1920),
in order to map cities in accordance to their characteristics resulting from changes in mobility
technology and behavior. While the typical walking city was a dense urban setting spreading less
than a mile from its center, the automobile city easily expanded to more than 25 miles in diameter,
as a function of substantially increased mobility. In line with this sprawl came a decrease in urban
density, since more or less the same number of people were accommodated on a much larger area.
While urbanized areas in the US had a density of 6,160 people per square mile in 1920, the figure
decreased to 2,589 in 1990. As a result, formerly unoccupied agricultural land became a valid
option for residential and commercial real estate development, significantly increasing suburban
real estate values. Examples for cities which became heavily fragmented and less dense after the
introduction of the automobile include Los Angeles, Denver, Phoenix, Houston, and Jacksonville.
Urban areas with a more historic context, such as many European cities, but also some in the
United States, weren't that much impacted in their respective centers, but still expanded drastically
in area. As of the late 1990s for example, the city of Chicago accounted for not more than 6% of
its total metropolitan area (Melosi, 2010).
Kopecky and Suen (2010), who quantitatively analyze causality between automobiles and
suburbanization, derive a similar conclusion. While the automobile's diffusion might not be the
only reason for urban sprawl and the suburbanization of the 20'h century, it surely was its main
driving force. The automobile substantially decreased the total costs of individual transportation.
Along with rising incomes, which led to increased affordability of individual automobiles, more
urban households decided to relocate from city centers. This in turn led to expanding metropolitan
areas, decreasing population density, and thriving real estate values of formerly unused suburban
or agricultural land.
According to the American Association of Automobiles (AAA), as of 2017, the annual cost of
owning and operating an automobile in the US was approximately US$ 8,500 on average. These
costs include depreciation, financing, maintenance and repair, and fuel, and will be brought in
context in upcoming sections (Stepp, 2017).
Apparently, there is strong consensus in academic literature that the emergence and diffusion of
the automobile was key in leading to the areal expansion of cities in the 2 0h century. However, it
was surely not the only reason.
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2.1.2 Public Transportation and its impact on Land Values
Schofer (2018) defines public transportation in the Encyclopaedia Britannica as
"...the movement of people within urban areas using group travel technologies such as buses
and trains " (Schofer, 2018).
Other features of public transportation include that many people are carried in one vehicle, that
routes are fixed and set fares are charged. Since costs for public transport usually cannot be covered
by its revenues, services tend to be subsidized. As a result of these subsidies, the services are
affordable for the majority of a city's population, who utilizes them to arrive at work or school, to
consume daily goods and services, and to participate in social life and entertainment. Schofer adds
that the demand for public transport, which has the means to directly affect the character of urban
life, is highly dependent on the role of the automobile in the respective area.
One of the main differences between public transportation and the automobile as a tool for
individual transportation is the level of flexibility in routes. While car ownership allows the
traveler to freely choose timing and directions, public transport schedules and stops are essentially
set in stone. However, the loss of flexibility is compensated for by affordability. Owning
automobiles requires substantial initial investment and ongoing maintenance and running costs,
whereas the sharing character of public transportation, along with governmental subsidies, leads
to relatively low ridership fares (Banister, 1995).
In many American cities public transport has become so affordable and convenient that land values
are directly and significantly impacted by its presence. Other things being equal, values of real
estate with good access to transportation will be higher than values in underserved locations. Under
certain circumstances, dispersed cities like Los Angeles or Houston, where the individual
automobile still plays the central role in urban mobility and public network coverage is relatively
poor, can be exceptions to this rule. In their analysis of 60 North American studies about public
transport's impact on land values, Higgins and Kanaroglou (2016) show that LVU (Land Value
Uplift) coefficients vary not only across different cities, but also depend on the type of transit
system.
16
(a) 70% -- N
LRT
II
40%So ans
WXs AngelN
-10%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 390 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 00
WUKse ibSlssalm eges)
Figure 1: LVU Coefficients Across American Cities
(Higgins and Kanaroglou, 2016)
As demonstrated in Figure 1, LVU coefficients show to what extent land values increase with
proximity to public network access points. In New York, for instance, the average value of land
right next to a heavy rail transit (HRT) access point (metro stop) is more than 60% higher than the
average land value 800 meters from the next metro stop.
While access to HRT and commuter rail transit (CRT) is seen to increase land value significantly,
proximity to light rail transit (LRT) and bus rapid transit (BRT) does not necessarily have a positive
effect in any given location. Most importantly, so Higgins and Kanaroglou (2016), in order to impact
land values, transit options need to be useful and competitive alternatives compared to other means
of transportation.
With its origins rooting back to the 17th century (Maniere, 2017), public transport has become one
of the major and most affordable mobility sources within urban settings and was seen to
substantially influence people's decisions where to live and work. Fares vary among different
means of public transportation, and are typically ranging between US$ 0.49 (HRT and CRT) and
US$ 0.75 (LRT) per passenger mile in the US (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2016).
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2.2 Mobility in the 21st Century
Although denial of global warming still exists, as of the second decade of the 21th century
humanity has reached broad academic acceptance that its survival on planet earth highly depends
on sustainable and efficient use of available resources and substantial decrease of pollution
(Anderegg et al., 2010). According to EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency),
transportation is the largest single source of greenhouse gas emissions, caused primarily through
burning fossil fuel for cars, trucks, ships, trains, and planes (EPA, 2018). Therefore, mobility
receives a lot of attention when it comes to potential solutions to create a future-proof society.
Recent innovations in the mobility sector have in common that they tackle emission-related
problems, either by optimizing the utilization of existing vehicles, or by lowering transportation's
carbon footprint with employment of alternative energy sources. That these ecological
improvements are often just a byproduct of new means to make financial profits goes without
saying.
2.2.1 Car Sharing
In 2017, for every 1,000 inhabitants in the US, 910 motorized vehicles were made use of by US
residents. Even though only 451 of these 910 units were individual automobiles - excluding
commercial and multi-passenger vehicles - the US remain one of the most extensively motorized
nations (Capitol, 2018). Given that privately owned cars are operated less than one hour each day,
translating into an average utilization rate of 4%, it was only a matter of time that this obvious
inefficiency would be tackled by innovation (Arbib and Seba, 2017).
Shared-Use Mobility Center (SUMC), an organization with the goal to bridge private and public
sector interest groups and support US government officials in developing regulatory guidelines
and standards for mobility innovations, describes car sharing as a service facilitating short-term
and on demand access to automobiles for individuals, who acquire memberships for the specific
car sharing provider. The provider meets demand with a fleet of vehicles available to its members.
The most common models of car sharing are round-trip, where the user picks up and returns the
vehicle at the same spot, and point-to-point, which enables the pick-up location to deviate from
the return location. Apart from large organized car sharing providers, also private individuals are
able to monetize their cars by enrolling them in car sharing programs. This model is called peer-
to-peer and enjoys growing popularity (SUMC, 2017).
18
While the term car sharing can be traced back to the Switzerland of the late 1940s, it took until the
early 21" century to really take off and enter the mass market on a global scale. Car sharing
companies like Zipcar, Flexcar, and City Car Club were all founded in the early 2000s, before
major car rental firms, including Avis, Hertz, and Enterprise entered the market between 2008 and
2010 (Belson, 2010).
Today, the global car sharing market is dominated by car2go and Zipcar with 2.5 million and 0.8
million registered members, respectively (car2go, 2017). The global fleet size of all major car
sharing providers combined in 2017 was approximately 100,000 cars, while the total market
accounted for revenues of US$ 1.5 billion (Global Market Insights, 2018).
A recent market study carried out by Global Market Insights estimates the car sharing industry to
grow at 20% per year, exceeding revenues of US$ 11.0 billion by 2024. The positive outlook
counts on a few major drivers, such as stringent government regulations related to emission
standards of privately owned cars, a lack of adequate transportation infrastructure in underserved
regions, advanced reservation and parking solutions improving the user experience for car sharing
service models, and the reduction of household costs for transportation, since annual cost savings
can reach up to US$ 5,200 per person, when compared to private car ownership (Global Market
Insights, 2018).
These cost saving claims are roughly in line with the analysis of car sharing rates in 80 US cities,
carried out by Schwieterman and Bieszczat (2017). They find that the average car sharing rate is
approximately US$ 10 per hour. Applying above mentioned car utilization of one hour per day for
365 days a year, car sharing would cost the user US$ 3,650 per year, providing savings of US$
4,850 compared to average car ownership costs of US$ 8,500 per year.
2.2.2 Ride Hailing
RH providers are companies utilizing online applications in order to match passengers with drivers
who use their private cars for carrying out assigned transportation services. Thereby, these
companies use elaborate algorithms to connect the right drivers with the right passengers in order
to optimize routes, trip durations, waiting times, and prices. Some providers reduce total trip
numbers by adding carpooling features to RH, in so far that drivers can take in additional
passengers with similar routes or destinations. This method is sometimes referred to as car splitting
(SUMC, 2017).
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Due to its dependence on advanced information technology, RH is a more recent innovation
compared to car sharing. The industry's pioneer, Uber, was founded in San Francisco in 2009,
currently operates in 633 cities, and is valued at US$ 68 billion according to its most recent funding
round financed by SoftBank. This valuation makes Uber the most-highly valued privately held and
venture-backed company worldwide. On a global scale, Uber's major competitors are US based
Lyft, founded in 2012 and currently valued at US$ 12 billion, and Beijing based DiDi with a
valuation of US$ 56 billion (Huston, 2017; Johnson, 2017).
The main reason for these companies' high valuations only a few years after they started operations
is the tremendous growth expected for the industry. As of 2017, 15 million ride hailing trips were
being made on an average day around the globe. By 2030, Goldman Sachs expects this number to
increase to almost 100 million daily trips, leading to a total estimated industry value of US$ 285
billion (Huston, 2017). The RH industry's dynamics are also displayed by a study carried out by
Research and Markets. Only six months after Goldman Sach's analysis, Research and Markets
updated the outlook in so far, that the above stated industry value would not be achieved by 2030,
but already by 2025 (Wood, 2017).
As compared to other mobility options covered in earlier sections, RH is the only solution
combining the benefits of total route flexibility, 24/7 availability, wide area coverage in urban
settings, and no need for vehicle ownership, nor any kinds of memberships.
Additionally, these benefits come with relatively high affordability, since passenger costs per mile
are usually ranging between US$ 1.00 to 1.80, and expected to further decrease in the future
(Henao, 2017; Dunne, 2018). However, considering above mentioned US$ 8,500 annual cost for
private car ownership and applying an annual driving distance of 10,000 miles, car ownership,
with costs of US$ 0.85 per mile, still appears less expensive than fully relying on RH services
(Bums, Jordan and Scarborough, 2013). Obviously, this pure view on costs does not consider that
RH passengers can utilize travel time to perform alternative tasks other than operating the vehicle.
As of 2018, user penetration rate in the US is 17.8%, meaning that 58.49 million Americans are
already actively using RH services, up from 40.57 million in 2016 and expected to amount to 77.44
million until 2022. With 50.2%, penetration is highest among 25 to 34 year olds, and lowest (1.8%)
in the age group above 55. On a global comparison, only China, with 20.9%, has a higher overall
penetration rate than the United States. With US$ 30 billion, China is also the only country with
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higher annual RH revenues than the US with just over US$ 17 billion. In line with other developed
nations around the world, both countries are expected to roughly double their RH revenues until
2022 (Statista, 2018).
Lastly, Ward et al. (2018) find that due to the above mentioned benefits of RH, car ownership rates
and vehicle registration rates in US cities are already seen to go down significantly, when access
to RH services emerges in the respective area.
2.2.3 Autonomous Vehicles as an Accelerator for Ride Hailing
"We are on the cusp of one of the fastest, deepest, most consequential disruptions of
transportation in history. By 2030, within 10 years of regulatory approval of autonomous
vehicles (A Vs), 95% of U.S. passenger miles traveled will be served by on-demand autonomous
electric vehicles owned by fleets, not individuals..." (Arbib and Seba, 2017)
Arbib and Seba are not alone with their opinion that autonomous vehicles will substantially impact
the transportation industry. Also, along with them, many industry experts don't necessarily expect
isolated disruptive effects resulting from autonomy alone. Instead, they rather see disruption
coming from a combination of autonomy with electrification, on-demand availability, and most
importantly, the factor of sharing rather than owning vehicles. While latter factors are seen to
change the nature of people's mobility behavior and the transportation industry's carbon footprint,
autonomy predominantly adds one essential key benefit - cost savings. Currently, the biggest cost
factor in the RH supply chain is labor. Obsolescence of drivers achieved through almost full
autonomy of vehicles will drastically reduce the cost base for RH fleets, what will result in much
lower fares for passengers (Serafeim and Freiberg, 2017). Almost full autonomy, or autonomy
level 4, means that a car can drive without any human input, as long as it is moving on mapped
terrain. Major automakers, including Ford, GM, Honda, and Toyota are currently claiming that
they are on track to provide level 4 AVs no later than 2021, and they are already actively
cooperating with leading RH service providers (Walker, 2018).
Analyzing cost effects of adding autonomy to RH, Burns, Jordan and Scarborough, (2013) analyze
various case studies and come to the conclusion that passenger costs per mile can be reduced to
US$ 0.41 per mile with shared driverless vehicles, and even to US$ 0.15 with shared driverless
purpose-built vehicles. Applying again an average of 10,000 driven miles per year, this would
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translate to annual costs of US$ 1,500 to 4,100, or to savings compared to private car ownership
of US$ 4,400 to 7,000 per year.
Not even considered in this example is the factor time saving. This doesn't mean that trips in AVs
would be shorter in duration, but since maneuvering the car is automated and route flexibility
provides door-to-door transportation without changing vehicles, travel time can be used effectively
for working, reading, or even sleeping, and thereby increase productivity. Considering an annual
income of US$ 50,000, 40 hours work per week, and 50 weeks a year, the gained productivity
would be US$ 25 per passenger hour of travelling or commuting. Apparently, also parking
expenses would fall away, since shared AVs will be able to carry out trips around the clock. Even
in non-peak hours, where not the complete fleet will be utilized, AVs are unlikely to occupy
expensive inner-city parking spots rather than just taxiing around or parking for free in less central
locations (Bums, Jordan and Scarborough, 2013).
2.3 Mobility Summary
Table 1 provides a brief summary of costs for different transport types, as presented in this chapter.
Information about average speed, which is also shown in Table 1, is derived from the Public
Transportation Fact Book published by the American Public Transport Association (Neff and
Dickens, 2017). The summary demonstrates that RH in combination with autonomous driving has
the potential to become the most affordable transportation mode, once technology and regulation
related challenges are resolved.
COSTS Public Rail Car Car Ride RH
in US$ Service Ownership Sharing Hailing + AV
Avg. Cost p.a. 4.9k - 7.5k 8.5k 3.7k 10.0k - 18.0k 1.5k - 4.lk
Avg. Cost / mile* 0.49-0.75 0.85 0.37 1.00- 1.80 0.15-0.41
Avg. Speed 21.7 mph 14.1 mph 14.1 mph 14.1 mph 14.1 mph
Operation req. No Yes Yes No No
Table 1: Average Mobility Expenses and Speed for Different Transport Modes
(Own illistration)
Impacts of current mobility innovations can be wide ranging. For instance, corresponding studies
imply that RH in combination with level 4 autonomy can potentially increase car utilization rates
from currently 4% to 40%, suggesting a possible reduction of car ownership and total private fleet
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size by 85% to 90%. In combination with that, the commoditization of car production in line with
the replacement of complex internal combustion engines with simple electric motors is a real threat
for established automakers and is expected to reshape the whole automotive industry (Serafeim
and Freiberg, 2017).
Also, recent studies are challenging the previous view that RH would have a complementary
relation to public transport. Instead, RH's net effect on public transport appears to be negative.
Especially bus and light rail services are already seen to significantly lose passengers to RH
providers, implying a substitutive rather than a complementary relationship (Hoffmann, Ipeirotis
and Sundararajan, 2016; Clewlow and Mishra, 2017; Welch, Gehrke and Widita, 2018; Jiang et
al., 2018)
History of both the automobile and urban public transportation shows how mobility influences
people's behavior and thereby shapes urban settings and impacts land values in different locations.
Apparently, this is not so much dependent on the nature of mobility innovations itself, but comes
back to efficiency increases reducing time and money spent for commuting.
What can be derived from this history is that future enhancements of mobility, given they lead to
efficiency improvements and financial benefits for commuters, most likely will impact people's
decisions on where to live and work. Thereby, as demand for real estate in certain areas will shift,
mobility innovations are likely to influence real estate values in the future as they have in the past.
Reflecting on how mobility access affected land values in the past, and on which innovations are
shaping today's transportation industry, RH can be expected to have the biggest impact on real
estate going forward. RH combines the benefits of automobiles (door-to-door mobility with high
flexibility in timing and routes) with the benefits of public transport (no vehicular operation and
parking required), and is expected to become even more competitive in terms of pricing over time.
Referring to the LVU analysis carried out by Higgins and Kanaroglou and mentioned under 2.1.2,
Bliss (2016) adds that RH services are set to decrease LVU coefficients. She argues that access to
public transport will lose its relative importance, as RH becomes affordable enough to substitute
public rail and bus services. While this would lead to higher real estate prices in areas underserved
by public transport, values in well-connected locations would suffer on a relative basis.
Based on this argumentation, the remainder of this thesis will focus on RH's potential impact on
real estate. Moreover, conclusions will be derived for the event of further acceleration of the trend
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to decreasing car-ownership rates and declining use of public transport in light of the emergence
of RH platforms supported by AVs. Mechanics behind the reasoning will be described in the
following chapter.
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3. REAL ESTATE AND LOCATION
According to FirstMention (2009), "Location, Location, Location", expressing the three most
important considerations for real estate investors, was first used in a Washington Post broker ad
on March 30 in 1952. Since then, the term has established itself as a mantra for real estate
professionals around the world.
1. location: .Y.Vad@
2. location .14 .1
3. location:
s IVW Xi~Ts1kP, 4900 T A.iRI;. ET W4 VAU &' is V
4
Figure 2: Washington Post Ad - Location, Location, Location
(Washington Post, 1952)
As shown in Figure 2, the tag line is explained with highlighting the importance of access to
amenities, public infrastructure, and transportation. As Chapter 3 of this thesis will demonstrate
based on typical real estate investment decision making processes and widely accepted
econometric models, the broker's claim could not have been more appropriate.
3.1 Location as Key-Driver for Investment Decisions
Before going deeper into the theoretical econometric framework describing how location impacts
property values, Section 3.1 briefly describes the two key consideration levels most investors have
in mind when analyzing the attractiveness of different locations.
3.1.1 Risk and Return Related Location Considerations
There is abundance of empirical and practical evidence that location related considerations are
fundamental when it comes to investment decisions in real estate (Newell, 2006; French, 1997).
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The significance of location directly roots back to one of the most obvious and characterizing
attributes of real estate - its immobility. Both, demand and supply side of the space market for real
estate are location specific. On the demand side, this can be intuitively visualized by the fact, that
an office occupier will rarely look for space in a pure residential neighborhood. On the supply side,
real estate's dependence on location is simply dictated by its inability to move (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1996).
In practice, the resulting space market segmentation leads to heavily differing income
characteristics among different locations. Not only do rents typically vary significantly among
different cities, but also among a metropolitan area's different submarkets. Rents in a city's central
business district are likely different than in the city's fringe or suburban area, while even individual
suburbs tend to have different rent levels and dynamics. In turn, these income dynamics of different
locations within different markets are the single most important factor influencing a real estate
investment's risk and return. Cap rates vary across different locations, as does the volatility of
rents. Thereby, a property's location has direct impact on both, the magnitude and the stability of
an asset's return on investment (Geltner et al., 2014).
Evaluating locations when investing in real estate, professional investors consider a variety of
factors. After starting on a macro-location level, where characteristics like economic growth, local
employment, population dynamics, demographics, education statistics, and regional demographics
are examined, the micro-location analysis hones in into factors such as proximity to local amenities
and public infrastructure, perceived image, crime levels, and, of course, access to individual and
public transport (UBS, 2017).
To sum up, the phrase location, location, location, as stated and described in Figure 2, qualifies as
relatively accurate, considering investment returns in real estate are highly dependent on macro-
and micro-location factors.
3.1.2 Diversification Related Location Considerations
Another perspective from which location matters is diversification. In the early 1950s, Harry
Markowitz revolutionized portfolio management by describing a quantitative approach to take
account for benefits of diversification within an investment portfolio. This approach, widely
known as Modern Portfolio Theory, shaped the investment management industry like hardly any
other theoretical framework. Even though the concept's assumptions are distinct simplifications
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of reality, its applicability in practice led to a new understanding of how asset allocation can be a
means in order to optimize risk-return-profiles of investment portfolios (Jakubowski, Steffen and
DieckvoB, 2010).
Markowitz' core message is that the total risk (standard deviation of returns) of a portfolio is lower
than the weighted average risk of the individual assets composing the portfolio, as long as the
individual assets' returns are not perfectly correlated. The weaker the correlation among different
assets, the lower is the overall portfolio's standard deviation. Theoretically, the risk of a portfolio
can be completely eliminated by combining assets which are perfectly negatively correlated
(correlation coefficient equals -1). However, perfectly negatively correlated assets rarely exist in
the real world, since certain events and market forces impact most assets and asset classes in
similar ways. Therefore, in practice, even a very well diversified portfolio will contain a residual
level of risk. This residual is called systematic risk, while the term unsystematic risk labels the
diversifiable risk share (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2011).
Soon after its publication, Modern Portfolio Theory was applied in asset allocation tools for multi
asset portfolios comprising stocks, bonds, and even commodities. The understanding of the
significance of low correlations between different assets in a portfolio led to growing appreciation
of alternative asset classes, including real estate. However, it took the real estate industry long to
promote the asset class' positive diversification effect resulting from its relatively low correlation
to more popular asset classes, like stocks and bonds (Spies, 2009).
Purely looking at real estate portfolios, diversification can primarily be achieved by investing in
different product types or different locations. According to Thomas and Wellner (2007), who
analyze a number of empiric studies related to asset allocation within real estate portfolios,
diversification through location is by far the most effective way in order to achieve low correlations
across assets, and thereby a high positive diversification effect.
While diversification aspects are highly important considerations regarding building and
structuring a real estate portfolio, this thesis focuses on income dynamics rather than asset
allocation. However, it should be pointed out that the factor location not only affects return profiles
of assets in different locations, but can also be a means to diversify within a broader portfolio. This
perspective just further reinforces the earlier mentioned real estate mantra's appropriateness.
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3.2 Economic Perspective on Location Value
So far, this section is an illustration of how the importance of location is widely accepted in the
real estate industry. It goes without saying that a claim that persistent would not go unnoticed by
economists for long. In fact, many attempts have been made to systematically explain location
value with quantitative approaches resulting in a wide range of economic and econometric
frameworks. Some of them are introduced and briefly explained in the following.
3.2.1 The Classical Monocentric City Model
Although it has its roots in von Thuenen's (1826) Isolated State Model, Alonso (1964), Mills
(1967), and Muth (1969) are considered the fathers of the Monocentric City Model. It is a strongly
simplified framework describing a city of the shape of a perfect circle. Residential areas are
arranged around the circle's central point, where all businesses, and therefore all jobs, are
concentrated. The city's residents are commuting along radial routes from their houses to their
workplaces at the central business district.
Rent
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Figure 3: Cross-Section of the Monocentric City Model
(Own illustration following Geltner et al., 2014)
The model follows a classic utility maximization function, where residents have to deal with a
tradeoff between decreasing transportation costs and increasing rents the closer they live to the
city's center. Residents living closer to the center will be exposed to lower costs for their daily
commute and therefore will be able to spend more on rents, sustaining the same level of total
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expenses and welfare. Thereby, rents, and land values, at the center are higher than at less central
areas. Land outside the city's edge can be seen as agricultural farm land.
Figure 3 is a schematic cross-section of the Monocentric City Model following Geltner et al.
(2014). The diagram shows rent (as a proxy for value) on its vertical, and distance to the city's
midpoint on the horizontal axis. The base AR illustrates the region's agricultural rent, which can
be understood as a farmer's opportunity value for land he has to receive in order to be willing to
sell his land for the purpose of urban housing development. The second base, stretching from one
urban boundary to the opposite side of the city, represents construction rent (CR). CR can be
interpreted as the annualized cost of developing a housing unit. Only if achievable market rents
reach a level of the combined value of AR and CR, development of housing becomes financially
feasible. The puzzle's last piece is the city's location rent (LR), which increases with closer
proximity to the city center. This is illustrated by the so called bid-rent curve, which is the upward
sloping line between the urban boundary and the city center. Since rents and transportation
expenses are a household's only costs in the Monocentric City Model, the model's equilibrium
requires rents to increase as commuting costs decrease, in order to balance utility across all
residents. Thereby, the condition must hold that the combined costs of housing and commuting are
identical at every location across the whole city. Resulting from that, the bid-rent curve's slope,
the rent gradient, is a direct, and in this simple version of the model even linear, function of
transportation costs. Understandably, rents increase the closer one gets to the center, where less
time and money has to be spent in order to commute shorter distances on a daily basis. As a result,
the total rent (AR + CR + LR) arrives at its peak at the circular city's most central point.
Even though the model's assumptions are a greatly simplified abstraction from the complex reality
of urban agglomerations, Mills and Tan (1980) highlight the rare nature of simple theories leading
to so many testable implications as the Monocentric City Model. Geltner et al. (2014) add that the
model is a typical example of how simplified models can help to comprehend reality.
3.2.2 The Polycentric City Model
As shown in Figure 4, the Polycentric City Model directly builds on the Monocentric City Model.
Jobs are still concentrated around central points in a city, but other than in a monocentric city, a
polycentric city has more than one of those focal points to which the city's residents commute.
29
These decentralized subcenters are driven by centrifugal forces, motivating both workers and
employers to relocate from congested city centers.
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Figure 4: Cross-Section of the Polycentric City Model
(Own illustration following DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996)
A key result of the establishments of additional employment subcenters is a reduction of average
commuting time, and therefore of average commuting costs. As Muller (1981) and Garreau (1991)
point out, this claim is strongly supported by empirical evidence. Since the Monocentric City
Model demonstrates that rents are a direct function of commuting costs, the lower costs in the
polycentric city also lead to comparably lower average housing rents. Figure 4 makes this
graphically evident, by showing rent levels in the respective subcenters as compared to the rent
that would theoretically prevail in a monocentric city, here shown in red. Another advantage of
the polycentric structure relates to population growth. In a monocentric city, population growth
leads to a steeper slope of the bid-rent curve and therefore to an increase in transportation costs. In
a polycentric city, however, population growth can be absorbed by the establishment of additional
subcenters. Apart from explaining implications for land values and transportation costs, the
Polycentric City Model can also be an adequate tool to derive conclusions about employment and
wage levels in different locations across a city. In fact, most cities in the real world are, at least to
a certain extent, rather polycentric than monocentric, which only increases the models
applicability. However, since implications of certain demographic or economic modifications can
differ between monocentric and polycentric reflections, economists are advised to be attentive to
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and thoughtful about the decision making process that leads to the utilization of one or the other
model.
For instance, while transportation improvements - in terms of lower commuting cost - will lead
to flattening bid-rent curves in the in Monocentric City Model, consequences are more ambivalent
in polycentric cities. Here, temporary flattening of bid-rent curves could theoretically lead to the
disappearance of some of the existing subcenters. Fewer subcenters in turn, will lead to a
steepening of bid-rent curves, potentially offsetting the flattening effect of cheaper transportation
(DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996).
3.2.2 Other Approaches Explaining Location Value
Apart from the frameworks explained so far, according to Angel and Blei (2015) there are at least
three more models enjoying broad academic attention when urban transport and land use policy
related questions are raised, and explanations for the spatial structure of contemporary American
cities are sought-for.
The Maximum Disorder model, for instance, is essentially the exact opposite of the Monocentric
City Model. The model assumes transportation cost of zero leading to negligibility of location
related considerations. In a city where commuting is cost-free, any desirability of proximity
between residences and workplaces is lost. As a result, both residences and workplaces are
completely randomly spread across the city, with certain clusters only appearing by pure chance.
Thereby, it serves as null hypothesis for any claim that any observable interrelation exists between
location and value of land.
Secondly, the Mosaic of Live-Work Communities Model is an extreme extension of the
Polycentric City Model. Here, every single employer serves as individual subcenter and all its
employees are based in residences within immediate proximity to their workplaces. If a firm
relocates its business, employees will either move their homes following their employer, or look
for new employment in direct proximity to their residences. If a resident loses her job, she will
relocate her home to any alternative place where she finds new employment.
The last candidate highlighted by Angel and Blei is the Constrained Dispersal Model, which can
be categorized somewhere between the Mosaic of Live-Work Communities Model and the
Polycentric City Model. Residents do not necessarily have to live right next to their employer, but
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tend to stay at least within a tolerable commute distance, creating fewer subcenters than the Mosaic
of Live-Work Communities Model, but more than in a polycentric city.
3.3 Location Value Summary
Remarkably, every noteworthy economic model dealing with the spatial structure of contemporary
cities acknowledges a considerable interrelation between location and land value. Moreover, the
common theme among the introduced models is that they build on the general rules of the
Monocentric City Model and define travel costs are the key driver of location value. Even the
Maximum Disorder Model acknowledges this concept, insofar that its lack of central points is a
direct function of cost-free commuting. This finding alone stresses how important it is to appreciate
transportation related considerations in order to understand real estate prices and price dynamics.
The frameworks first introduced by the Monocentric City Model form the foundation for every
other introduced model that refers to one or more central locations as focal points in a city (centric
models). Therefore, the following section will use the Monocentric City Model's basic mechanics,
in order to explain and predict potential impacts of RH and AVs on real estate prices. The model's
elegant simplicity, its apparent appreciation of transportation costs as key factor impacting land
values, and its proven track record of leading to testable conclusions for reality, makes it suitable
for the purpose of this thesis, and its covered topics. However, also some of the other introduced
centric models will be called on to discuss certain implications and findings in later sections.
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4. APPLIED ECONOMICS: FORMING A HYPOTHESIS
In previous sections, this thesis gives a summary of how mobility influenced urban shapes in the
past, which mobility innovations are expected to potentially alter urban transportation in the future,
and which economic models explain interdependences between transportation and residential
settlement behavior, i.e. land values. Chapter 4 integrates these considerations by discussing how
property values theoretically should react to a further diffusion of RH. The basic mechanics of the
Monocentric City Model are used in order to present general expectations about how residential
real estate prices should behave facing technology induced cost reductions for urban
transportation, before Chapter 5 analyzes, if residential real estate prices in New York City are
actually showing empirical evidence that certain reactions are already happening.
4.1 Derivations from the (Mono-)Centric Framework
As discussed in Chapter 2, the price for RH currently is still higher than for the use of public
transport and the ownership and operation of private automobiles - see Table 1. Notwithstanding
the comparably high price, RH is already seen to negatively impact car ownership rates in urban
settings (Ward et al., 2018) and public transit ridership, especially looking at LRT and BRT
services (Higgins and Kanaroglou, 2016). RH's substitution effect for other transportation modes
is only expected to intensify in light of decreasing prices facilitated by technology improvements.
Especially future obsolescence of human car operators could decrease RH service provider's cost
base substantially, enabling them to compete for riders with much lower prices. While the exact
timeline of how quick RH services will be able to further increase their market penetration cannot
be known, the impact of transportation technology improvements on a centric city framework can
be explained relatively straight forward.
A monocentric city can only be in equilibrium, when the slope of the bid-rent curve equals
transportation costs. The same is true for centric models with more than one focal points. Thereby,
the cost of transportation does not simply equal the price for a train ticket, car ownership, or RH
service. Another important factor impacting the total cost of transportation is the value of time,
since time used for traveling could otherwise be utilized productively. This also means that the
faster a transportation mode can take someone from A to B, the lower is its total cost. Another
implication of time value is that costs for transportation can be further reduced if vehicles are made
to enable productive activity during the ride.
If a technology improvement decreases transportation costs considering the above mentioned
factors, then the rent gradient will decrease, as illustrated in Figure 5. All else equal, the lower
transportation costs will decrease the relative attractiveness of central compared to less central
locations. This in turn will negatively impact rent levels in more central locations. Since real estate
values can be understood as multiples of achievable rents, values in central locations will go down,
while values at the urban boundary will remain constant (Geltner et al., 2014).
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Figure 5: Technology Improvement in a Monocentric City - Scenario 1
(Own illustration following Geltner et al., 2014)
A second option for residents in the subjective monocentric city is to accept farther rides for their
daily commutes, since the cost per mile has decreased. If workers opt for residences farther away
from their workplaces, population density will decrease and urban boundaries will expand
outwards. This potential effect is illustrated in Figure 6, showing that rents and values in the center
will decrease, while the old urban boundary will see increasing rents and values (Baum-Snow,
2007).
Also Kopecky and Suen (2010) argue that if technological improvements lead to decreasing
transportation costs, metropolitan areas will expand as a function of declining population density.
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Figure 6: Technology Improvement in a Monocentric City - Scenario 2
(Own illustration following Geltner et al., 2014)
All these considerations lead back to Figure 1 in Chapter 2. The concept behind LVU coefficients
increasing land values with closer proximity to public transport access points is based on exactly
the same framework as upward-sloping bid-rent curves: the centric mechanics first introduced by
the Monocentric City Model. In Figure 1, the city center is replaced by rail or bus stations as central
reference point, and the urban boundary is replaced by the 800-meter-point (0.5 miles), which has
established itself as proxy for acceptable walking distance in most academic studies dealing with
related topics. This centric framework has established itself as the method of choice in estimating
LVU coefficients related to public transport considerations (Higgins and Kanaroglou, 2016). So
when Bliss (2016) points towards claims that RH would negatively impact LVU coefficients, she
is essentially referring to decreasing rent gradients in a centric city context.
As explained by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) and Angel and Blei (2015), short-term effects
on rent gradients are generally the same in the multicentric framework adapted by the Polycentric
City Model and the models introduced in Section 3.2.2. The main difference between mono- and
multicentric mechanics occurs in the long run. Over time, the temporary flattening of bid-rent
curves in a multicentric metropolitan area might lead to the disappearance of some of the existing
subcenters. Fewer subcenters in turn, will lead to a steepening of bid-rent curves, potentially
offsetting the flattening effect of cheaper transportation. This holds true if centers are flexible and
susceptible to urban dynamics. However, in terms of transportation related LVU coefficients,
firmly established and largely inflexible public transport stops are the model's focal points.
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Therefore, in a centric model context, public transport lines can be best exemplified as a chain of
small monocentric cities.
4.2 The LVU Concept and its Application in Land Value Capture
The LVU coefficient framework itself has proven its applicability numerous times. In fact, it is
widely accepted that access and proximity to public transport increases property values (Higgins
and Kanaroglou, 2016). On the other hand, public transport projects are rarely profitable ventures
and are typically heavily subsidized by the taxpayer. This in turn usually leads to controversial
public and political discussions about the financing of such projects. The tension between
beneficiaries and cost bearers of public infrastructure projects led to the rise of certain land value
capture concepts. Today, most improvements of public transport, including Boston's recent Green
Line extension, are at least partly funded by land value capture models. In particular, the so called
tax increment financing (TIF), invented and first used in the early 1950s in California, enjoys
popularity among policymakers. TIF is a fiscal tool often incorporated to bridge the gap between
low revenues and high operating expenses of public transportation systems. Without going into
details, the basic idea is to redirect parts of the transportation improvement induced land value
increase to the public budget. It does this by declaring certain TIF districts affected by the
infrastructure improvement, capturing increased property values by benefitting from higher
property taxes, and using tax revenue increases to reinvest in infrastructure. In turn more and more
private investors will be attracted by the area, further increasing land values, and thus further
increasing tax revenues. Even though there is still a debate about TIF's effectiveness and its
fairness related to the distribution of its benefits, it is widely applied and further evidence for the
relevance of public transport accessibility for land values (Medda, 2012).
If now RH indeed becomes a substitute for public transportation and challenges LVU coefficients,
this would not only lead to far reaching implications for home owners and real estate investors,
but also for policymakers working on and arguing for public transportation improvements in the
future. Public transport access points becoming less and less important for real estate values would
essentially mean that land value capture models like TIF would become less applicable, if not
completely obsolete. More provocatively, questions can be raised about the need for public
transport systems themselves. Road capacity questions aside, who needs public transportation if
RH provides better service for lower fares?
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: PRICE DYNAMICS IN NEW YORK CITY
In terms of absolute numbers and relative penetration rates, New York City is one of the world's
biggest markets for RH (Jiang et al., 2018). Yellow cabs, once the dominant source of over ground
transportation in the city, are now outnumbered I to 4 by RH vehicles. Compared to pre-Uber
times, the number of daily trips carried out by yellow cabs has decreased by approximately 30%,
making taxis another transportation mode, alongside public transport and private cars, getting
disrupted by RH (Sugar, 2017). The prevalence of RH in New York makes the city an ideal market
for the purposes of this thesis.
On top of that, some real estate brokers claim that they already observe a RH effect in New York,
stating that this relatively new form of mobility drives especially outer borough's residential real
estate values more than anything else, including macroeconomic factors and politics. These
statements relate to the claim that proximity to public transport becomes decreasingly important
for home owners, since RH provides an affordable substitute without being limited to fixed rail
routes (Gamm, 2017).
Ideally, RH's impact on residential real estate values would be evaluated by integrating a region's
RH incidence level into a hedonic model with real estate value as dependent variable. Since neither
Uber nor Lyft are sharing ridership data, and since real estate values are a rather unobservable and
theoretical concept, this thesis will utilize certain proxies as workaround to understand correlative
patterns. However, it should be noted that the lack of data for ridership, which could have
explanatory power when added to the subjective hedonic model, will leave some endogeneity
related questions unanswered.
5.1 Base Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to investigate RH's impact on residential real estate values, mainly two data sources are
utilized and described in the following. To derive a proxy for real estate values, this thesis uses
Department of Finance (2018) real estate sales data comprising 1,264,443 real estate transactions
carried out between January 2003 and June 2018 in New York City's five boroughs. This database
provides the exact address of each transacted property, as well as its transaction price, and a set of
further characteristics.
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Since this thesis focuses on residential real estate, data points referring to other use types are
eliminated, reducing the sample size to 961,137 observations. Moreover, incomplete or inaccurate
information on price, size, address, or other characteristics across transactions further limits the
usable number of observations to 271,216. Lastly, since data on 2003 and 2004 transactions is
largely incomplete, these years are deleted from the data set. After adjustments, the final sample
includes a total of 257,100 residential real estate transactions, comprising approximately one
million residential units with over one billion square feet usable area, totaling a deal volume of
almost US$ 280 billion, and spanning the time period from January 2005 until June 2018.
To facilitate testing the hypothesis that RH substitutes public transport and thereby decreases LVU
coefficients, a complete data set of all 455 metro access points in New York City is used (Open
Data New York, 2015). In order to provide full coverage of the city's rail network, 95 additional
stops operated by entities not included in the initial list were manually added. Manually added rail
services include the Staten Island Railway Service (SIR), the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Line
(PATH), and several HRT services in the city's northern and eastern areas. Consolidated, the data
set includes locations for a total of 550 heavy rail stops in New York's five boroughs.
Furthermore, New York's 344 Zipcar locations are added to the data set in order to estimate the
impact of mobility innovation from an additional perspective, i.e. enable testing if access to car
sharing affects real estate values in the sample area (Zipcar, 2018). car2go, as New York's second
largest car sharing provider after Zipcar, offers its service on a free-float concept without stationary
drop-off locations (car2go, 2018). Therefore, car2go locations cannot be integrated in the data set.
Smaller car sharing firms offering their services in the New York area are also not considered. The
consequentially incomplete coverage of car sharing access leads to a need for special diligence
when the estimations' results are interpreted.
Table 2 provides information on the sample used for the following investigations. The first section
of Table 2 summarizes basic statistics for key variables in the data set. It shows that the average
home in the sample sells for US$ 306 per square foot, and is located on average within 0.8 miles
of the closest public railway station and 3.9 miles from the nearest Zipcar location. Homes were
built in 1940 on average, but this does not consider renovations. The average transaction comprises
four residential units and a usable area of close to 4,000 square feet, and has a transaction size of
US$ 1.09 million. The lower two sections of Table 2 provide a comparison across different
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residential categories and New York's five boroughs, respectively. It can be seen that most deals
involve one- or two-family homes, accounting for 75% of the observed transactions, while the
remaining 25% consist of three-family homes and rental apartments. In terms of location, with
43% of the total sample, Brooklyn saw the most transactions, followed by Staten Island with 21%,
Queens with 17%, the Bronx with 15%, and Manhattan with 4%. The observed price per square
foot was highest for the category one-family homes
with US$ 455, respectively.
with US$ 344, and the borough Manhattan
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Price per sqft [USD/sqft] 306 279 10 9,564 257,100
Distance to Public Transport [miles] 0.8 0.9 0.0 5.9 257,100
Distance to Zipcar [miles] 3.9 3.4 0.0 15.2 257,100
Units per Transaction 4 33 1 8.800 257,100
Total Area per Transaction [sqft] 3,964 29,013 200 8,942,176 257,100
Construction Year 1940 33 1798 2017 257,100
Transaction Volume [MUSD] 1.09 8.13 0.01 2,147.48 257,100
CATEGORY One Family Duplex Triplex Rental Total
Observations 97,365 96,577 29,563 33.595 257,100
Transaction Volume [M. sqft] 177 234 94 514 1.019
Transaction Volume [BUSD] 60.8 64.4 22.7 132.0 279.6
Price per sqft [USD/sqft] 343.5 275.2 242.5 256.8 274.4
BOROUGHS Manhattan Bronx Brooklyn Queens Staten Island Total
Observations 10,689 39,107 110,206 43,754 53,344 257,100
Transaction Volume [M. sqft] 196 218 378 120 107 1,019
Transaction Volume [BUSD] 89.2 31.4 100.0 34.0 24.9 279.6
Price per sqft [USD/sqft] 455.1 144.0 264.6 283.3 232.7 274.4
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
(Own illustration)
The lowest average prices per square foot are seen in the three-family home category with US$
243, and in the submarket Bronx with US$ 144, respectively. These values might appear relatively
low in comparison to current market prices. However, this can be explained with the sample
containing a number of portfolio deals at times when portfolio discounts still existed, and with the
sample spanning over 14 years, and therefore covering earlier periods when prices in New York
were lower than nowadays. Since the data set does not include information about building quality,
no definite conclusions can be drawn from this factor, but given the low average price, it points to
quality variation in the homes.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of transactions across time. The time series starts with more than
30,000 transactions in 2005, followed by a drop of more than 50% during the global financial
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crisis. It takes until 2012 that numbers are starting to pick up again, before evening out on a
relatively constant level of 20,000 transactions per year. It has to be highlighted that Figure 7 only
shows transactions that qualified for the final sample, and absolute numbers would be higher if the
complete data set would be considered. However, the relative directional movement in the figure
is representative of the complete data set.
Sale Year Distribution
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Figure 7: Sale Year Distribution
(Own illustration)
5.2 Geo Mapping Proximity Zones
The variables Distance to Public Transport and Distance to Zipcar are not included in the
Department of Finance data set, and therefore have to be generated. Using geocoding software
ArcGIS, the address of each transacted property, HRT stop, and Zipcar location in the final data
set is converted into its exact geographic coordinates. Deriving longitude and latitude for each
location allows measuring proximity to the closest public transport access point and Zipcar
location, and would already enable the computation of straight-line distances between individual
addresses. Since the following analysis will be more accurate using actual travel distances rather
than straight-line measurements, a map set of New York's street grid is utilized. Thereby, polylines
are computed, measuring the length of the actual route between each individual property and its
closest HRT stop and Zipcar match, following the city's existing street grid. In this way, we
compute transportation distances for each of the appended data.
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Figure 8: NYC ArcGIS Geo Mapping Process
(Own illustration)
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Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the mapping procedure. First, HRT stops (red squares), Zipcar locations
(green squares), and addresses of transacted properties (blue circles) are geocoded in order to
receive their exact coordinates. Second, the three entity layers are contextualized by overlapping
them. Finally, by integrating a set of street maps, origin-destination pairs are computed across the
three layers and polyline distances are measured. As a result, the final sample data set includes the
distance for each individual property to both, its next closest public rail station and Zipcar facility,
as summarized in Table 2.
nN
10 Miles
Figure 9: NYC ArcGIS Transaction and Mobility Map
(Own illustration)
One observation that can be made from Figures 8 and 9 is that transaction density is highest in
Brooklyn (central) and Staten Island (south-west), since these areas appear in darker blue than the
remaining boroughs. Density appears to be lowest in Queens (east), while Manhattan (north) and
Bronx (north-west) are somewhere in between.
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In a last step, 16 different zones dependent on properties' distance to HRT stops are defined. Zone
1 covers a radius of 0.1 miles from HRT stops, Zone 2 a radius from 0.1 to 0.2 miles, Zone 3 a
radius from 0.2 to 0.3 miles, and so forth, until Zone 16, which covers all areas farther than 1.5
miles from the closest HRT stop.
Zone Distribution
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Figure 10: Zone Distribution
(Own illustration)
Figure 10 illustrates the distribution of transactions across the defined zones. Not surprisingly,
residential density is highest in areas with good public transport access. Therefore, the highest
numbers of transactions can be observed within walking distance, often defined as 0.5 miles, from
HRT stops. The longest distance measured in the sample data set is 5.9 miles, meaning Zone 16
covers a much larger area than every other zone, namely the area spanning a radius from 1.5 to 5.9
miles. The large area explains the high number of transactions in this least central zone.
5.3 Methodology
To investigate how proximity to public rail access points influences the transaction price of
residential real estate in New York, a standard hedonic real estate valuation framework is applied
(Rosen, 1974). A hedonic equation is estimated, relating the transaction price per property to
building characteristics, distance to the next public rail station and zip car location, and time:
logPi = a + fXi + SDi + yT + E
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In the base model, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the transaction price P per square
foot of property i. The variable of interest of the model is D, which measures the distance in miles
to the public rail station closest to property i. 6 is thus the average discount or premium (in percent)
estimated for each mile of distance between property and rail station. X is a vector of hedonic
characteristics (e.g. size and age) and location of home i. Lastly, using quarter fixed effects, T
controls for macro-economic factors. a,,8, and y are estimated coefficients for the control variables,
and e is an error term.
The possibility that unobserved differences between the properties in the data set determine the
observed capitalization differences cannot be entirely ruled out with this model specification.
Especially the lack of information on building quality attributes leads to a need for increased
caution when interpreting the model's results, which happens in the following section.
5.4 Results
First, the value of proximity to public transport is assessed using the complete observed time period
from 2005 until 2018 across all five New York boroughs. Various regression trials lead to the
conclusion that the relationship between real estate values and proximity to HRT stops is not linear,
but quartic. The estimated models explain up to 59% of the variation in the logarithm of price, and
can be referred to in the Appendix. Additional results are available upon request.
The first column in Table 3 relates the transaction price to the property's distance to public
transport to the power of one, two, three, and four. While coefficients in column one lack in
showing the mentioned quartic relationship and are not statistically significant, their explanatory
power is improved when adding further variables to the regression model.
The second column controls for the asset category, whether the subjective transaction consisted of
one-family homes, two-family homes, three-family homes, or rental apartments. Rental apartments
serve as reference category in this model, so that this category is not shown in the regression
output.
In columns three, four, and five age, total usable area, and deal size are added to the analysis, while
column six controls for macro-economic factors by additionally taking the sale quarter into
consideration. At this stage, every estimated coefficient is statistically significant, while, on the
other hand, the overall model fit still is relatively poor.
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Column seven controls for which of the 254 defined neighborhoods the property is located in.
While adding the categorical variable Neighborhood contributes substantially to the overall model
fit, increasing its R2 from 0.18 to 0.39.
Column eight adds distance to the next closest Zipcar location to the model, in order to assess a
potential effect of car sharing access on real estate values. Even though the coefficient is
statistically significant, it does not allow for interpreting it as a causal factor. Zipcar locations are
usually located in close proximity to major public transport stops, therefore it is questionable which
effect is picked up by this coefficient. Moreover, the coefficient is rather small and also would
imply a negative value of proximity to car sharing.
The model is consistent in its message that one-family homes show the highest prices per square
foot, followed by two-family homes, three-family homes, and rentals. The premium for one-family
homes as compared to rental apartments amount to 48%, illustrated by its coefficient in column
seven.
When it comes to building age at the time of its sale, the estimated model suggests a positive effect.
For every additional year of age, property prices in the sample increase by 0.1%, suggesting
appreciation rather than depreciation, the latter of which would be expected according to literature
and common sense. Further investigation by rerunning regressions with ten different age groups
spanning over ten years each supports the positive coefficient. While a positive age effect appears
counterintuitive, not too much attention should be attributed to this coefficient. Even though its p-
value suggests statistical significance, the data set does not include any information on renovations,
other building improvements, or maintenance conditions. Therefore, in this case age alone might
not have as much explanatory power as one would normally expect, and omitted building quality
related variables might lead to endogeneity in the model.
The coefficient for the variable Total Area is consistently negative. The model in column seven
estimates it to be -0.007, meaning for an increase of 1,000 square feet, the price per square foot
goes down by 0.7%. The coefficient's negative algebraic sign is in line with expectations, since in
practice smaller residential units usually sell for higher per square foot prices than larger ones
(Schiffman, 2015). In part, this is due to the fact that fixed construction costs for certain
installations and infrastructure required for every unit are distributed over a smaller number of
square feet.
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On the other hand, per square foot prices go up with bigger deal sizes. For every additional million
dollars of deal size, prices in the sample increase by 2.7%. That does not surprise either, since high
prices of residential properties usually go in line with higher overall quality, which increases the
relative price. On top of that, the recent years led to the emergence of a phenomenon called
portfolio premium. Rather than getting bulk discounts when buying large numbers of residential
units, nowadays portfolio premiums are more rule than exception. This is a simple function of the
existing lack of investment opportunities to deploy the current abundance of available capital. The
bigger a portfolio is, the more attractive it gets for large scale institutional investors (JLL, 2015).
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance to PT 0.100*** -0.200*** -0.031** -0.034** -0.006 -0.047*** 0.150*** 0.151***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
Distance^2 -0.008 0.134*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.057*** -0.166*** -0.169***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.016]
Distance^3 -0.009** -0.037*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.053*** 0.055***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005 [0.005]
Distance^4 0.001* ** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
One Family Home 0.372*** 0.403*** 0.395*** 0.385*** 0.373*** 0.483*** 0.483***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
Duplex 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.163*** 0.321*** 0.320***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Triplex -0.009 0.015** 0.008 0.016* 0.016* 0.178*** 0.177***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Total Area (1000sft) -0.001* -0.012*** -0.0 l1*** -0.007*** -0.007***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Deal Size (MUSD) 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.027*** 0.027***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
Distance to ZC 0.006**
[0.002]
Constant 5.458*** 5.382*** 5.106*** 5.117*** 5.104*** 4.959*** 5.188*** 5.188***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.057] [0.057]
Observations 257,100 257,100 257,100 257,100 257,100 257,100 257,100 257,100
R-squared 0.004 0.045 0.067 0.068 0.141 0.180 0.389 0.389
F Adj R2 0.0037 0.045 0.067 0.068 0.14 0.18 0.39 0.39
Table 3: Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Quartic Distance Function
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.0 5 , * p<0.1)
The model consistently applies a quartic function dependent on an asset's distance to the next
closest HRT stop. The coefficients in column six are in line with existing literature, in so far that
the value first declines with increasing distance due to aggravated public transport accessibility.
Only after arriving at a certain distance, values go up again, which can be a result of various factors,
including a decline in congestion, change in demographics, or other location related aspects. Other
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not observed factors lead to another decrease when distance increases further. The described
movement is shown by the bright blue line in Figure 11.
However, adding control for neighborhoods in column seven of Table 3 reverses the function, as
illustrated by the dark blue line in Figure 11. Now, values first increase up to a distance to public
transport of 0.5 miles, before they form a trough at a distance of 2.5 miles, go up to a maximum at
5.0 miles, and then fall again.
Distance Coefficients with and
without Control for Neighborhoods
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Figure 11: Distance Coefficients with and without Control
(Own illustration)
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The functions reversal leads to the question whether controlling for neighborhoods might have
adverse effects on the explanatory power of distance coefficients. At the first glance, there might
be an argument for multicollinearity, since the attractiveness of a certain neighborhood might
depend on its overall accessibility, which in turn could lead to a high correlation between the two
predictor variables Neighborhood and Distance to PT. However, since testing for multicollinearity
led to a negative result and the introduction of the variable Neighborhood leads to a substantial
increase in the overall model fit, the more likely explanation for the coefficients' reversal is an
omitted variable bias for the model not controlling for the variable Neighborhood.
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
-0.032***
[0.010]
-0.055***
[0.010]
-0.043***
[0.010]
-0.038***
[0.010]
-0.012
[0.010]
-0.003
[0.010]
0.033***
[0.011]
0.057***
[0.011]
0.073***
[0.011]
0.031***
[0.011]
0.012
[0.011]
0.030***
[0.011]
0.039***
[0.012]
0.016
[0.012]
-0.012
[0.010]
Duplex
Triplex
Age
-0.034***
[0.010]
-0.071***
[0.010]
-0.076***
[0.010]
-0.089***
[0.010]
-0.082***
[0.010]
-0.097***
[0.010]
-0.091***
[0.011]
-0.083***
[0.0111
-0.078***
[0.011]
-0.122***
[0.011]
-0.146***
[0.011]
-0.125***
[0.011]
-0.107***
[0.012]
-0.137***
[0.012]
-0.181***
[0.010]
0.369***
[0.005]
0.158***
[0.005]
-0.007
[0.006]
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.037***
[0.010]
-0.068***
[0.010]
-0.067***
[0.010]
-0.067***
[0.010]
-0.045***
[0.010]
-0.043***
[0.010]
-0.032***
[0.010]
-0.008
[0.011]
0.002
[0.011]
-0.029***
[0.011]
-0.055***
[0.0111
-0.034***
[0.011]
-0.021*
[0.012]
-0.043***
[0.012]
-0.084***
[0.009]
0.401***
[0.0051
0.173***
[0.005]
0.019***
[0.006]
0.001 ***
[0.000]
0.000***
[0.000]
-0.038***
[0.010]
-0.070***
[0.010]
-0.068***
[0.010]
-0.069***
[0.010]
-0.047***
[0.010]
-0.045***
[0.010]
-0.034***
[0.010]
-0.010
[0.011]
0.000
[0.011]
-0.031***
[0.011]
-0.057***
[0.011]
-0.036***
[0.011]
-0.023*
[0.012]
-0.045***
[0.012]
-0.087***
[0.009]
0.393***
[0.007]
0. 165***
[0.007]
0.011
[0.007]
0.001 ***
[0.0001
0.000***
[0.000]
-0.001 *
[0.000]
-0.026***
[0.010]
-0.051***
[0.010]
-0.050***
[0.010]
-0.050***
[0.010]
-0.028***
[0.010]
-0.025**
[0.011]
-0.015
[0.011]
0.008
[0.011]
0.014
[0.012]
-0.014
[0.011]
-0.037***
[0.012]
-0.016
[0.012]
-0.002
[0.012]
-0.028**
[0.012]
-0.067***
[0.010]
0.383***
[0.009]
0.166***
[0.008]
0.019**
[0.009]
0.002***
[0.000]
0.000***
[0.000]
-0.012***
[0.002]
0.046***
[0.008]
-0.026***
[0.009]
-0.054***
[0.009]
-0.053***
[0.010]
-0.056***
[0.010]
-0.037***
[0.010]
-0.037***
[0.010]
-0.031***
[0.010]
-0.010
[0.011]
-0.006
[0.012]
-0.034***
[0.011]
-0.058***
[0.012]
-0.039***
[0.011]
-0.024**
[0.012]
-0.049***
[0.012]
-0.088***
[0.010]
0.371***
[0.009]
0.163***
[0.008]
0.019**
[0.009]
0.002***
[0.000]
0.000
[0.000]
-0.011***
[0.002]
0.044***
[0.008]
0.012
[0.008]
0.019***
[0.007]
0.030***
[0.008]
0.029***
[0.008]
0.043***
[0.008]
0.036***
[0.008]
0.037***
[0.009]
0.032***
[0.009]
0.0 17*
[0.009]
-0.001
[0.009]
-0.009
[0.010]
0.024**
[0.010]
0.011
[0.010]
-0.001
[0.011]
-0.005
[0.010]
0.483***
[0.008]
0.321***
[0.007]
0.178***
[0.007]
0.001***
[0.000]
-0.000*
[0.000]
-0.007***
[0.001]
0.027***
[0.005]
0.012
[0.008]
0.019**
[0.007]
0.030***
[0.008]
0.029***
[0.008]
0.043***
[0.008]
0.036***
[0.008]
0.036***
[0.009]
0.031***
[0.009]
0.016*
[0.009]
-0.002
[0.009]
-0.011
[0.010]
0.022**
[0.010]
0.009
[0.010]
-0.003
[0.011]
-0.007
[0.010]
0.483***
[0.008]
0.320***
[0.007]
0.177***
[0.007]
0.001***
[0.000]
-0.000*
[0.000]
-0.007***
[0.001]
0.027***
[0.005]
0.004*
[0.002]
5.519*** 5.398*** 5.145*** 5.156*** 5.135*** 4.983*** 5.192*** 5.193***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.057] [0.057]
257,100
0.003
0.0026
257,100
0.043
0.043
257,100
0.066
0.066
257,100
0.067
0.067
257,100
0.140
0.14
257,100
0.179
0.18
257,100
0.389
0.39
257,100
0.389
0.39
Table 4: Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.0 5 , * p<0.1)
In general, it can be argued that New York City is a too heterogeneous market to analyze these
effects on an overall basis. Consequently, the following analysis will focus on analyzing New
York's five boroughs separately, and explore whether coefficients substantially changed over time.
In order to facilitate this analysis, 48 additional regressions are computed, covering six submarkets
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(five boroughs plus New York City overall) and four different time periods (2005 -2009, 2010-
2014, 2015-2018, and 2005-2018), all carried out for both, with and without control for the variable
Neighborhood.
To allow for a more fragmented analysis of coefficients at different distance levels, instead of
using the quadric function approach, previous distance variables are substituted by 16 categorical
variables representing the 16 distance zones introduced in section 5.2. Table 4 is an example for a
regression output following this methodology, while the remaining regression outputs can be found
in the Appendix. The first 30 rows contain coefficients and standard errors for Zone 2 to Zone 16,
bringing their relative value into context with the reference variable Zone 1. The remaining setup
is consistent with Table 3. By comparing columns six and seven, the reversion of algebraic signs
when adding control for Neighborhood can be observed again.
Figures 12 and 13 graphically illustrate the results of the 48 regressions. The six graphs on the left
hand side refer to New York City and its five individual boroughs without controlling for
Neighborhood, while the graphs on the right side include this additional control factor. The lines
in the graph show the distance coefficients for each defined radius category, from Zone 1 to Zone
16. The dashed black lines refer to the data set's complete time period from 2005 to 2018, while
the solid blue lines only cover shorter sub-periods. Dark blue stands for the time period 2005 until
2009, medium blue for 2010 to 2014, and light blue for the most recent period ranging from 2015
to 2018. Zone 5, representing the upper end of walking distance with 0.4 to 0.5 miles from the next
closest HRT stop, is chosen as reference point, where the four lines in each respective graph meet.
The first set of graphs cover the complete city. Notably, the change over time is visible at the first
glance. While the overall shape of the lines remains similar, the clockwise rotation around the
reference point in Zone 5 is remarkable. The dark blue line, covering the period 2005 to 2009,
suggests that residential real estate values increase with the distance to the next HRT stop. This
relationship is completely reversed in the most recent period, illustrated by the light blue line,
which shows that values decrease with distance to public transport. The medium blue line,
covering 2010 to 2014, is midway between the lines for the youngest and oldest periods. Adding
Neighborhood control to the regressions decreases the gaps between the respective lines, but
generally supports the rotational factor.
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first time bucket, became negative in the second period, and then substantially positive in the most
recent three years. However, results for Manhattan should not be overrated, since coefficients are
largely not statistically significant, which goes in hand with the small sample size for this
submarket. Observations outside the walking distance zones are especially rare, as a result of the
excellent public transport coverage in Manhattan. This explains the wild movement of coefficients,
once Zone 5 is crossed. Since the sample contains no Manhattan transactions outside Zone 12 at
all, meaning all observed transactions happened within 1.2 miles of HRT access, all lines become
perfectly flat for the area from Zone 13 to Zone 16.
The third chart set in Figure 12 refers to the submarket Bronx. While the lines are similarly shaped
from Zone 6 to Zone 16, the gap that opens up within walking distance of HRT is notable and in
line with New York City overall. Especially Zone 1 gained substantial relative value over the years,
overtaking most other central locations, while it was the least valuable zone from 2005 to 2009.
As for Manhattan and overall New York City, this is suggesting that the importance of immediate
access to HRT has become more important over time.
Brooklyn, referred to by the first set of graphs in Figure 13, draws a similar picture. Not only have
Zone 1 and Zone 2 increased their relative value significantly over time, but also the earlier
described rotational factor is evident in this borough. Less central locations, especially outside
Zone 9, have substantially lost value, making the one-mile mark highly important here. Not
controlling for Neighborhood, the sharp decrease starts even earlier at Zone 7.
Queens is the exception from the rule in this analysis. It is the borough with the smallest observable
time effect, hardly changing the lines' shapes and positions across the different periods. Not
controlling for Neighborhood, there is at least some value of immediate HRT access (Zone 1), but
overall real estate prices are higher in less central locations. Controlling for Neighborhood, the
small positive effect of HRT access disappears completely, suggesting that public transport access
in Queens doesn't matter at all, or can even be detrimental to residential real estate values.
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noise factors compared to other submarkets, making it easier to isolate specific effects with limited
data. Having said that, it is not necessarily surprising that both graphs, with and without control
for Neighborhood, look very similar. Even though all lines are relatively flat in this example, two
aspects stand out when looking at them. First, as for Manhattan, Bronx, and Brooklyn, relative
values in Zone I go up substantially in the most recent period. Second, also the rotational aspect
can be observed again, leading to the conclusion that not only central locations increase in value,
but also that less central locations lose relative value over time. All this is especially true for the
most recent period from 2015 to 2018, while for the previous two periods there appears to be less
fluctuation over time.
As discussed, this analysis is subject to certain limitations, but should stimulate further research
on the subject matter. First of all, the regression model's overall fit could be improved with data
about additional hedonic characteristics, especially when it comes to quality related aspects of
transacted properties. Moreover, the analysis could be further refined with gathering data about
RH ridership incidence in different New York submarkets in order to support causality related
parts of the argumentation. Also a more qualitative research approach could be applied by
conducting surveys asking homebuyers about factors impacting their decision where to live or
invest. Lastly, expanding the research to other markets with different urban shapes, transportation
patterns, or demographic characteristics might throw further light on the subject matter.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It can be concluded that first, immediate access to HRT is beneficial for real estate values in most
New York City submarkets, and second, proximity value has increased over time, and especially
within the past three years. Chapter 6 reviews the analysis' results, contextualizes them with
current supply and demand dynamics in the transportation sector, and discusses potential
implications of the thesis' findings.
6.1 Review of Results in Context with the (Mono-)Centric Framework
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Monocentric City Model, or better to say centric city frameworks
in general, advocate that innovation in mobility leads to decreasing rent gradients, or LVU
coefficients, negatively affecting the relative value of real estate in central locations. While this
might hold true in a self-contained ceteris paribus world, the empirical evidence presented in this
thesis suggests that it is not true for present day New York City, when brought into context with
public transport access.
ARelative Value
-......- Total - 05-09
-- -10-14 -- - 15-18
Walking Distance
1.5M 0.5M HRT Stop 0.5M 1.5M
Figure 14: Centric Framework and Multivariate Zone Coefficients w/o Neighborhood Control
(Own illustration following Geltner et al., 2014)
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As highlighted in Chapter 5, the period from 2015 to 2018 was shaped by a substantial increase in
rent gradients, especially in areas within walking distance to public transport, when referring to
HRT stops as focal points in the centric model. This can be best demonstrated by overlapping the
basic cross-section of the Monocentric City Model from Figure 3 with the New York City zone
coefficients from Figure 12, as shown in Figure 14 (without control for the variable Neighborhood)
and Figure 15 (controlled for Neighborhood).
Relative Value
-......- Total - - 05-09
---- 10-14- - 15-18
Walking istance
1.5M 0.5M HRT Stop 0.5M 1.5M
Figure 15: Centric Framework and Multivariate Zone Coefficients with Neighborhood Control
(Own illustration following Geltner et al., 2014)
While rent gradients towards HRT stops are even slightly negative in the period from 2005 to
2009, they somewhat flatten out between 2010 and 2014, and become substantially positive in the
most recent period from 2015 until 2018. For the model without Neighborhood control, values in
Zone 1 are 2.2% lower than in Zone 16 for the earliest period, 8.9% higher than in Zone 16 for the
period 2010 to 2014, and 26.8% higher than in Zone 16 for the most recent period (see Figure 14).
Adding Neighborhood control, Zone 1 values are 4.4% lower than in Zone 16 between 2005 and
2009, essentially equal between 2010 and 2014, and 8.2% higher between 2015 and 2018 (see
Figure 15). Exact values for each zone in each individual borough can be found as zone coefficients
in the regression outputs provided in the Appendix. It can be observed, that the most remarkable
shift happened within the 0.5-mile boundary, marking the upper end of walking distance to public
transport access points. The resulting interpretation is that the value of proximity to HRT stops has
increased over time, and especially since 2015. The only exception to this finding is the submarket
Queens, where the value of transit access appears to decrease.
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The rather unexpected results presented in Chapter 5 lead to the questions of why reality is not
behaving in accordance with widely accepted economic theory, and what happened around the
year of 2015, that it denotes such a significant pivoting point in the development of LVU
coefficients within walking distance of HRT stops.
6.2 Demand and Supply in Flux
As illustrated in Figure 16, 2015 marks the year when Uber first hit the mark of 100,000 daily trips
in New York City. Moreover, 2015 was a turning point for HRT transit in New York City. After
a decade of constant increase in ridership, reaching 4.8 million daily trips in 2015, the number of
subway trips has only fallen since then, despite the fact that New York's metropolitan population
is still growing (Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 2018). At the same time, growing
exponentially, Uber has increased its number of daily trips to more than 450,000, cannibalizing
the taxi industry, which has been losing over 150,000 daily trips from its long term average of
approximately 450,000 (Schneider, 2018).
New York City Ridership and Population
500,000 9,000,000
450,000 .W GNP 8,000,000
. 400,000 7,000,000
. 350,000 6,000,000
300,000
~ 25,00 mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm5,000,000a250,000 C...L..-- - """ "-
200,000 4,000,000 H
>, i00o 3,000,000
100oo00 2,000,000
50,000 1,000,000 'A
0 0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Uber - Taxi - - - Subway - - - Population
Figure 16: New York City Ridership and Population
(Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 2018 & Schneider, 2018)
Thus, the substantial increase of relative real estate values close to HRT stops falls in the same
period as exorbitant growth of RH and declining HRT ridership. While correlation must never be
confused with causality, the simultaneous occurrence of these developments is cause for further
research. The fact that HRT ridership goes down, while home values indicate rapidly growing
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importance of HRT access, appears rather counterintuitive. However, there may be other factors
at play that are not measured at a neighborhood scale to date.
Going back to this thesis' hypothesis that access to mobility innovations like RH could weaken
rent gradients towards HRT stops, the evidence provided in the present analysis suggests exactly
the opposite. To elaborate on why that might be the case, one has to deconstruct the underlying
assumptions which lead to the hypothesis in the first place. The fundamental logic behind is the
linear event chain that RH, as a regionally flexible door-to-door mobility solution, would be a
substitute for public transport, and therefore make HRT access a less important factor when
deciding where to live. The conducted literature review, as well as the information provided in
Figure 16, indeed suggest that a substitution effect is present, suggesting the first part of the
hypothesis' explanation is in line with anecdotal evidence and supported by economic theory, most
importantly by centric city frameworks, as outlined above.
100.0%.
90.0%.
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%.
1983
&2008
.2011
.2014
30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 6044 65-69 t7o
Age
16 17 18 19 20-24 25-29
Figure 17: Licensed Drivers as a Percentage of their Age-Group Population
(Sivak and Schoettle, 2016)
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On the other hand, an element that was not considered, is the optionality that RH might impact
more than one factor that in turn influences decision making processes when buying homes. For
instance, Sivak and Schoettle (2016) find that driver's license issuance and application rates have
decreased considerably over the last decades, especially among younger generations below the age
of 45 - see Figure 17. In light of the emergence of new mobility solutions, leading mobility
innovation experts, including Tesla's Elon Musk and UC San Diego's Henrik Christensen, confirm
this development in recent years and even claim that people born today will never even get to drive
a car, making driver's licenses a thing of the past (Javelosa and Marquart, 2017).
Thus, one explanation of the rather unexpected recent increase of rent gradients could be that RH,
besides partially substituting for public transport, might be a trigger for further decreasing driver's
license application and car ownership rates. With fewer people intending to own and operate cars
in the future, proximity to HRT access might even become a more important consideration for
homebuyers than it used to be in the past, as long as alternatives do not provide full substitution.
This second effect resulting from mobility innovation, could potentially outweigh the public
transport substitution effect, and lead to the observed steepening of the bid-rent curve. This
argument can be supported by the fact that decreasing license rates are especially high among
younger generations, who are not only fast in adapting new technology, but also constitute the bulk
of homebuyers affecting residential real estate prices in metropolitan areas.
Having said that, the analysis' unexpected results do not mean that implications suggested by
centric city frameworks are wrong, or not applicable for New York City. In fact, one could also
argue for potential significant differences between short-term and long-term effects of the
emergence of RH. Even though RH is already massively increasing its market share and
established mobility sources are suffering under the newly arisen competition, RH today is still far
from being an adequate solution for typical daily commuter routes. If RH would become a fully
accepted perfect substitute for urban HRT services in the future, rent gradients would indeed be
likely to decrease over the long run. As elaborated in Chapter 2 and summarized in Table 1, experts
suggest that RH could become the most efficient and affordable urban transportation mode in the
future, if technological and regulatory challenges are overcome in order to provide the service with
purpose build AVs. If that would happen, public transportation would run into serious risk of losing
its competitiveness and RH could become a perfect substitute for HRT. No later than that, rent
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gradients towards HRT stops should indeed flatten out, and shapes and demographics of cities
would likely be subject to massive changes.
6.3 Policy and Investment Implications
If and when RH will seriously start challenging HRT is not only a question of technological
progress, cost reduction, market penetration, and efficiency increases, but first and foremost one
of public policy. Every year, cities spend billions of dollars and employ thousands of people for
the operation, maintenance, and expansion of subway and other HRT services. The high costs and
the public nature of these services make decisions related to public transport highly political and
their consequences wide-ranging. If a private company like Uber would start to challenge HRT
revenues, it should expect heavy resistance from government officials. In fact, many cities are
already applying special taxation on RH trips, decreasing their relative attractiveness compared to
public transport, while other cities have banned RH completely (Hao, 2017). Keeping public
transportation in business is not the only reason why many cities are reluctant to accept RH. A
large increase in congestion is an inevitable consequence of people shifting their daily commute
from HRT lines onto streets, if current technology is utilized. This is why mobility experts argue
that RH can only be a long term solution for urban transport, if it increases its efficiency and
decreases emissions by uniting the three factors autonomous driving, vehicle sharing, and
electrification (Serafeim and Freiberg, 2017). If implemented correctly, RH even has the potential
to substantially decrease traffic and congestion (Alonso-mora et al., 2018 & Vazifeh et al., 2018).
In any case, the example of Uber, Lyft, and Didi bans in various cities around the world
demonstrates how essential it is for RH providers to have policy makers play along in the process
of bringing change to urban transport. In the long run, however, history shows that true innovation
is usually capable of shaping legislation.
It was the Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus around 500 BC, who already observed that
change is our society's only constant (Wheelwright, 1959). It is no secret that change in form of
technological disruption usually leads to the emergence of two groups: beneficiaries and losers.
For real estate investors to be on the winning side it will be crucial to closely monitor mobility
related developments from the perspective of both, technology and regulation. Thereby, academia
can play a vital role in supporting investors by building on the results and refining the frameworks
presented in this thesis. With real estate investment markets becoming more and more efficient,
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systematic alpha creation becomes increasingly challenging. On the other hand, the smart investor
knows that change always leads to opportunities. However, creation of alpha is not only subject to
identifying triggers of change, but, as the rejection of this thesis' initial hypothesis demonstrates,
even more importantly a result of thoroughly analyzing data and drawing informed conclusions.
Lastly and most importantly, as the introductory example of Prologis shows, what really separates
winners from losers is the proactive transformation of informed conclusions into real actions.
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APPENDIX
NEW YORK CITY 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
-0.032*** -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 0.012 0.012
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
-0.055*** -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.051*** -0.054*** 0.019*** 0.019**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
-0.043*** -0.076*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.050*** -0.053*** 0.030*** 0.030***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.0101 [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
-0.038*** -0.089*** -0.067*** -0.069*** -0.050*** -0.056*** 0.029*** 0.029***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.0101 [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
-0.012 -0.082*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.028*** -0.037*** 0.043*** 0.043***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
-0.003 -0.097*** -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.025** -0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
0.033*** -0.091*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.015 -0.031*** 0.037*** 0.036***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
0.057*** -0.083*** -0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.010 0.032*** 0.031***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]
0.073*** -0.078*** 0.002 0.000 0.014 -0.006 0.017* 0.016*
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009]
0.031*** -0.122*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.014 -0.034*** -0.001 -0.002
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]
0.012 -0.146*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.037*** -0.058*** -0.009 -0.011
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.030*** -0.125*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.016 -0.039*** 0.024** 0.022**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
0.039*** -0.107*** -0.021* -0.023* -0.002 -0.024** 0.011 0.009
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.016 -0.137*** -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.028** -0.049*** -0.001 -0.003
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
-0.012 -0.181*** -0.084*** -0.087*** -0.067*** -0.088*** -0.005 -0.007
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
0.369*** 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.383*** 0.371*** 0.483*** 0.483***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
0.158*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.166*** 0.163*** 0.321*** 0.320***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
-0.007 0.019*** 0.011 0.019** 0.019** 0.178*** 0.177***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.001 * -0.012*** -0.01l1*** -0.007*** -0.007***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
0.046*** 0.044*** 0.027*** 0.027***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
0.004*
[0.002]
5.519*** 5.398*** 5.145*** 5.156*** 5.135*** 4.983*** 5.192*** 5.193***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] [0.057] [0.057]
257,100
0.003
0.0026
257,100
0.043
0.043
257,100
0.066
0.066
257,100
0.067
0.067
257,100
0.140
0.14
257,100
0.179
0.18
257,100
0.389
0.39
257,100
0.389
0.39
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Table 5: Regression Output New York City 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.0 5, * p<0.1)
NEW YORK CITY 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I I
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Ad] R2
-0.085*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.066*** -0.067*** 0.003 0.004
[0.022] [0.0221 [0.0221 [0.022] [0.0211 [0.021] [0.016] [0.016]
-0.139*** -0.138*** -0.133*** -0.134*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.003 -0.001
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.0211 [0.0161 [0.016]
-0.154*** -0.159*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.008 -0.007
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.016] [0.016]
-0.180*** -0.195*** -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.005 -0.002
[0.022] [0.022] (0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.016] [0.016]
-0.194*** -0.216*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.135*** -0.138*** 0.008 0.010
[0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] [0.017] [0.017]
-0.221*** -0.258*** -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.006 -0.003
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.017] [0.017]
-0.219*** -0.270*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.004 0.000
[0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018]
-0.218*** -0.278*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.152*** -0.158*** -0.016 -0.010
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.018] [0.019]
-0.194*** -0.264*** -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.039** -0.032*
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.027] [0.019] [0.019]
-0.257*** -0.329*** -0.223*** -0.224*** -0.191*** -0.199*** -0.077*** -0.070***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.020] [0.020]
-0.289*** -0.365*** -0.258*** -0.259*** -0.216*** -0.222*** -0.067*** -0.060***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.027] [0.021] [0.021]
-0.248*** -0.320*** -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.180*** -0.190*** -0.025 -0.016
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.020] [0.020]
-0.241*** -0.304*** -0.200*** -0.201*** -0.164*** -0.169*** -0.027 -0.017
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.021] [0.021]
-0.292*** -0.364*** -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.220*** -0.231*** -0.084*** -0.073***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.022] [0.022]
-0.309*** -0.390*** -0.281*** -0.283*** -0.248*** -0.255*** -0.081*** -0.068***
[0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020]
0.119*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.328*** 0.330***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012]
-0.056*** -0.050*** -0.065*** -0.047*** -0.058*** 0.168*** 0.169***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.015] [0.015] [0.011] [0.011]
-0.174*** -0.171*** -0.185*** -0.161*** -0.170*** 0.025** 0.026**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.012]
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.001* -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.008***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
0.034*** 0.034*** 0.019*** 0.019***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005]
-0.022***
[0.005]
5.925*** 5.947*** 5.734*** 5.754*** 5.702*** 5.671*** 5.755*** 5.754***
[0.020] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026] [0.030] [0.032] [0.088] [0.088]
67,479
0.011
0.011
67,479
0.029
0.029
67,479
0.051
0.051
67,479
0.052
0.052
67,479
0.114
0.11
67,479
0.125
0.12
67,479
0.414
0.41
67,479
0.414
0.41
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Table 6: Regression Output New York City 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
NEW YORK CITY 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I I
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (I000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
-0.027 -0.030 -0.031* -0.032* -0.021 -0.021 -0.011 -0.012
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
-0.059*** -0.073*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 0.012 0.012
[0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
-0.051*** -0.085*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.050*** -0.048*** 0.030** 0.029**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
-0.047*** -0.103*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 0.027** 0.026**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
0.000 -0.076*** -0.044** -0.046** -0.018 -0.018 0.060*** 0,058***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014]
-0.001 -0.109*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.033* -0.035** 0.045*** 0.043***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014]
0.041** -0.106*** -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.027 -0.027 0.036** 0.034**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.015]
0.083*** -0.080*** -0.017 -0.018 0.012 0.010 0.046*** 0.042***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015]
0.092*** -0.081*** -0.011 -0.012 0.019 0.016 0.034** 0.030*
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016]
0.051*** -0.127*** -0.045** -0.047** -0.016 -0.020 0.018 0.014
[0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.016] [0.016]
0.020 -0.163*** -0.086*** -0.088*** -0.055*** -0.061*** -0.007 -0.011
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
0.033 -0.154*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.038* -0.045** 0.025 0.021
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
0.038* -0.133*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.032 -0.035* 0.012 0.006
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018]
0.001 -0.176*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.011 -0.017
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019]
-0.007 -0.203*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.090*** -0.091*** 0.000 -0.007
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
0.395*** 0.416*** 0.413*** 0.394*** 0.398*** 0.501*** 0.500***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
0.125*** 0.132*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 0.302*** 0,302***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
-0.057*** -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.031*** 0.141*** 0.140***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.007***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
0.060*** 0.059*** 0.029*** 0.029***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004]
0.011**
[0.004]
5.437*** 5.337*** 5.112*** 5.118*** 5.078*** 5.002*** 5.161*** 5.162***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020] [0.018] [0.021] [0.156] [0.156]
79,169
0.004
0.0035
79,169
0.054
0.054
79,169
0.067
0.067
79,169
0.068
0.067
79,169
0.162
0.16
79,169
0.173
0.17
79,169
0.445
0.44
79,169
0.445
0.44
68
Table 7: Regression Output New York City 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
NEW YORK CITY 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Ad R2
-0.007 -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 0.039*** 0.039***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.0111
-0.012 -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.024** -0.024** 0.042*** 0.041***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.013 -0.031** -0.026** -0.028** -0.016 -0.016 0.057*** 0.055***
[0.013] [0.0131 [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
0.037*** -0.028** -0.017 -0.020 -0.011 -0.010 0.055*** 0.053***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
0.067*** -0.022* -0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.004 0.056*** 0.054***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.0111
0.109*** -0.001 0.027** 0.025* 0.033*** 0.032** 0.058*** 0.056***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
0.151*** 0.009 0.034** 0.031** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.059***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
0.177*** 0.016 0.054*** 0.051 *** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.050***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
0.190*** 0.016 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.047*** 0.041***
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.0131 [0.013] [0.013]
0.168*** -0.006 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.030** 0.025*
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
0.162*** -0.019 0.034** 0.030** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.034** 0.028**
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
0.168*** -0.006 0.041*** 0.038** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.044***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
0.177*** 0.008 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.045*** 0.037**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
0.185*** 0.010 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.046***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
0.132*** -0.058*** 0.003 -0.000 0.008 0.010 0.039*** 0.029**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
0.488*** 0.524*** 0.513*** 0.457*** 0.460*** 0.530*** 0.530***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
0.306*** 0.336*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.283*** 0.397*** 0.396***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
0.139*** 0.195*** 0.185*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.278*** 0.278***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.001 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.060*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.042***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
0.016***
[0.003]
5.352*** 5.129*** 4.874*** 4.889*** 4.933*** 4.803*** 5.046*** 5.048***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.017] [0.015] [0.016] [0.062] [0.062]
110,452
0.015
0.015
110,452
0.080
0.080
110,452
0.103
0.10
110,452
0.104
0.10
110,452
0.182
0.18
110,452
0.195
0.19
110,452
0.351
0.35
110,452
0.351
0.35
69
Table 8: Regression Output New York City 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
MANHATTAN 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12= o,
Zone 13 = o,
Zone 14= o,
Zone 15 = o,
Zone 16= o,
-0.015
[0.035]
-0.047
[0.036]
0.025
[0.040]
0.035
[0.047]
-0.015
[0.081]
0.173**
[0.084]
0.116
[0.085]
0.480
[0.333]
-0.094***
[0.031]
0.282***
[0.031]
-0.025
[0.034]
-0.051
[0.034]
0.019
[0.038]
0.084*
[0.045]
0.028
[0.080]
0.075
[0.079]
0.248***
[0.079]
0.608*
[0.357]
0.101***
[0.030]
0.477***
[0.030]
-0.031
[0.033]
-0.047
[0.033]
0.023
[0.037]
0.089**
[0.044]
0.023
[0.080]
0.042
[0.079]
0.224***
[0.082]
0.555
[0.351]
0.536***
[0.043]
0.908***
[0.042]
-0.035
[0.033]
-0.051
[0.033]
0.019
[0.037]
0.084*
[0.044]
0.020
[0.080]
0.037
[0.079]
0.221 ***
[0.082
0.551
[0.351]
0.575***
[0.050]
0.947***
[0.049]
-0.023
[0.030]
-0.035
[0.030]
0.008
[0.035]
0.050
[0.042]
-0.041
[0.077]
0.056
[0.073]
0.183**
[0.077]
0.316
[0.230]
-0.461**
[0.204]
-1.426***
[0.386]
-0.007
[0.028]
-0.013
[0.029]
0.018
[0.033]
0.050
[0.040]
-0.034
[0.068]
0.114*
[0.067]
0.189**
[0.078]
0.497*
[0.254]
-0.656***
[0.184]
-1.486***
[0.342]
-0.028
[0.023]
-0.013
[0.024]
-0.052*
[0.028]
-0.087**
[0.035]
-0.323***
[0.062]
-0.154**
[0.063]
-0.214***
[0.075]
0.077
[0.275]
-0.558***
[0.141]
-1.044***
[0.245]
-0.028
[0.023]
-0.011
[0.024]
-0.046
[0.028]
-0.087**
[0.035]
-0.327***
[0.062]
-0.155**
[0.063]
-0.217***
[0.076]
0.070
[0.274]
-0.524***
[0.142]
-1.006***
[0.245]
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
1.065***
[0.030]
0.614***
[0.032]
0.372***
[0.039]
0.965***
[0.031]
0.500***
[0.033]
0.297***
[0.039]
-0.004*
[0.002]
0.000***
[0.000]
0.962***
[0.031]
0.497***
[0.033]
0.293***
[0.039]
-0.005**
[0.002]
0.000***
[0.000]
-0.000*
[0.000]
Distance to ZC
Constant
0.890***
[0.030]
0.500***
[0.031]
0.330***
[0.037]
-0.001
[0.002]
0.000***
[0.000]
-0.007***
[0.001]
0.025***
[0.004]
6.175*** 5.980*** 5.593*** 5.623*** 5.336***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.084] [0.085] [0.102]
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
10,689
0.001
0.00041
10,689
0.122
0.12
10,689
0.152
0.15
10,689
0.153
0.15
10,689
0.284
0.28
0.908*** 0.642*** 0.647***
[0.029] [0.023] [0.023]
0.532*** 0.487*** 0.491***
[0.029] [0.022] [0.022]
0.358*** 0.417*** 0.417***
[0.035] [0.026] [0.026]
0.004** 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
0.000* -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.022*** 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
-0.060***
[0.021]
4.787*** 6.082*** 6.199***
[0.097] [0.096] [0.105]
10,689
0.359
0.36
10,689
0.561
0.56
10,689
0.561
0.56
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Table 9: Regression Output Manhattan 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
MANHATTAN 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12= o.
Zone 13 = o.
Zone 14 = o,
Zone 15 = o,
Zone 16 =o,
-0.087
[0.064]
-0.129*
[0.066]
-0.086
[0.0741
-0.215**
[0.091]
0.012
[0.160]
0.177
[0.134]
-0.001
[0.110]
0.095*
[0.055]
-0.664***
[0.055]
-0.288***
[0.055]
-0.089
[0.063]
-0.121*
[0.064]
-0.108
[0.072]
-0.164*
[0.0891
0.099
[0.155]
0.206
[0.137]
0.117
[0.096]
0.276***
[0.054]
-0.483***
[0.054]
-0.107**
[0.054]
-0.101
[0.062]
-0.118*
[0.064]
-0.102
[0.072]
-0.156*
[0.089]
0.104
[0.154]
0.171
[0.143]
0.133
[0.091]
0.324***
[0.054]
-0.209***
[0.0791
0.164**
[0.078]
-0.101
[0.062]
-0.120*
[0.063]
-0.097
[0.072]
-0.159*
[0.089]
0.103
[0.153]
0.165
[0.142]
0.144
[0.090]
0.334***
[0.055]
-0.012
[0.167]
0.362**
[0.167]
-0.055
[0.054]
-0.064
[0.056]
-0.053
[0.064]
-0.143*
[0.085]
0.128
[0.120]
0.199
[0.131]
0.15 1*
[0.080]
-0.031
[0.079]
0.269
[0.250]
-0.964***
[0.370]
-0.041
[0.053]
-0.063
[0.055]
-0.045
[0.063]
-0.121
[0.081]
0.068
[0.105]
0.179
[0.120]
0.261***
[0.089)
0.072
[0.094]
0.356
[0.2341
-0.846**
[0.348]
-0.027
[0.044]
-0.032
[0.045]
-0.107*
[0.056]
-0.251 ***
[0.070]
-0.323***
[0.116]
-0.096
[0.108]
-0.238**
[0.109]
-0.379***
[0.082]
-0.074
[0.188]
-0.845***
[0.261]
-0.027
[0.044]
-0.030
[0.045]
-0.102*
[0.057]
-0.251***
[0.070]
-0.328***
[0.116]
-0.097
[0.108]
-0.238**
[0.109]
-0.392***
[0.084]
-0.046
[0.19 1]
-0.813***
[0.262]
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
0.911*** 0.845*** 0.836*** 0.749*** 0.739*** 0.494*** 0.498***
[0.056] [0.057] [0.057] [0.051] [0.050] [0.043] [0.043]
0.522*** 0.456*** 0.445*** 0.443*** 0.448*** 0.414*** 0.418***
[0.058] [0.059] [0.060] [0.053] [0.053] [0.0411 [0.041]
0.275*** 0.238*** 0.224*** 0.270*** 0.248*** 0.377*** 0.380***
[0.073] [0.073] [0.074] [0.068] [0.064] [0.053] [0.053]
-0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.003 0.006*** 0.006***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.001 -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.010***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
0.031*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.020***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
-0.048
[0.042]
6.745*** 6.564*** 6.290*** 6.359*** 6.036*** 5.894*** 7.026*** 7.119***
[0.055] [0.054] [0.139] [0.1461 [0.137] [0.145] [0.143] [0.169]
2,607
0.004
-0.00030
2,607
0.101
0.096
2,607
0.112
0.11
2,607
0.116
0.11
2,607
0.311
0.31
2,607
0.375
0.37
2,607
0.545
0.53
2,607
0.545
0.53
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Table 10: Regression Output Manhattan 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
MANHATTAN 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10 = o,
Zone I1 = o,
Zone 12= o,
Zone 13 = o,
Zone 14 = o,
Zone 15 = o,
Zone 16 = o,
0.034
[0.055]
0.004
[0.055]
0.076
[0.063]
0.096
[0.071]
0.017
[0.112]
0.147
[0.125]
0.043
[0.158]
0.439
[0.442]
0.011
[0.051]
-0.010
[0.051]
0.074
[0.059]
0.158**
[0.065]
0.069
[0.105]
0.063
[0.115]
0.175
[0.152]
0.491
[0.518]
0.004
[0.0501
-0.009
[0.0501
0.072
[0.058]
0.159**
[0.065]
0.064
[0.105]
0.035
[0.118]
0.128
[0.155]
0.461
[0.504]
0.002
[0.050]
-0.011
[0.051]
0.069
[0.059]
0.156**
[0.065]
0.062
[0.105]
0.032
[0.118]
0.125
[0.155]
0.458
[0.504]
-0.015
[0.044]
-0.007
[0.045]
0.042
[0.051]
0.133**
[0.058]
-0.034
[0.116]
0.032
[0.107]
0.132
[0.146]
0.293
[0.361]
-0.019
[0.044]
-0.001
[0.045]
0.041
[0.051]
0.147**
[0.058]
-0.046
[0.111]
0.056
[0.105]
0.064
[0.148]
0.416
[0.370]
-0.078**
[0.035]
-0.044
[0.036]
-0.049
[0.041]
-0.041
[0.049]
-0.371 ***
[0.093]
-0.224**
[0.088]
-0.359***
[0.134]
-0.065
[0.405]
-0.077**
[0.034]
-0.041
[0.035]
-0.040
[0.041]
-0.043
[0.050]
-0.379***
[0.093]
-0.221 **
[0.088]
-0.354***
[0.134]
-0.075
[0.399]
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
1.107*** 1.056*** 1.055*** 0.960*** 0.986*** 0.675*** 0.681***
[0.043] [0.045] [0.045] [0.042] [0.043] [0.032] [0.032]
0.624*** 0.557*** 0.555*** 0.550*** 0.557*** 0.493*** 0.499***
[0.050] [0.052] [0.052] [0.047] [0.047] [0.035] [0.035]
0.416*** 0.376*** 0.374*** 0.421*** 0.439*** 0.430*** 0.429***
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.054] [0.054] [0.040] [0.040]
-0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007*** 0.007***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.031*** 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
-0.099***
[0.031]
6.114*** 5.906*** 5.699*** 5.715*** 5.155*** 4.953*** 5.563*** 5.769***
[0.048] [0.046] [0.116] [0.116] [0.118] [0.143] [0.358] [0.355]
4,136
0.001
-0.00070
4,136 4,136 4,136
0.146 0.156 0.156
0.14 0.15 0.15
4,136
0.300
0.30
4,136
0.324
0.32
4,136
0.587
0.58
4,136
0.588
0.58
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Table 11: Regression Output Manhattan 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
MANHATTAN 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10 = o,
Zone I1 = o,
Zone 12 = o,
Zone 13 = o,
Zone 14 = o,
Zone 15 = o,
Zone 16 = o,
0.028
[0.056]
0.023
[0.056]
0.072
[0.061]
0. 132*
[0.077]
-0.035
[0.135]
0.341**
[0.141]
0.294***
[0.105]
0.891
[0.602]
0.024
[0.054]
0.018
[0.054]
0.075
[0.059]
0.163**
[0.071]
-0.039
[0.137]
0.153
[0.120]
0.432***
[0.091]
1.070*
[0.602]
0.029
[0.052]
0.014
[0.053]
0.079
[0.058]
0.178**
[0.071]
-0.046
[0.139]
0.135
[0.120]
0.421***
[0.091]
0.971
[0.601]
0.025
[0.053]
0.009
[0.053]
0.073
[0.058]
0.172**
[0.071]
-0.051
[0.139]
0.129
[0.120]
0.416***
[0.09 1]
0.966
[0.601]
0.041
[0.048]
0.016
[0.048]
0.066
[0.053]
0.089
[0.066]
-0.147
[0.137]
0.141
[0.111]
0.332***
[0.089]
0.565*
[0.302]
0.048
[0.047]
0.031
[0.048]
0.077
[0.052]
0.063
[0.066]
-0.112
[0.131]
0.166
[0.106]
0.301***
[0.101]
0.594*
[0.316]
0.042
[0.041]
0.047
[0.042]
0.026
[0.046]
-0.015
[0.063]
-0.283**
[0.117]
-0.049
[0.110]
-0.005
[0.122]
0.367
[0.375]
0.042
[0.041]
0.047
[0.042]
0.030
[0.046]
-0.014
[0.063]
-0.285**
[0.117]
-0.052
[0.110]
-0.011
[0.123]
0.364
[0.375]
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Ad] R2
1.049*** 0.981*** 0.978*** 0.866*** 0.849*** 0.673*** 0.676***
[0.054] [0.054] [0.054] [0.050] [0.050] [0.044] [0.045]
0.633*** 0.564*** 0.561*** 0.527*** 0.528*** 0.506*** 0.508***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.048] [0.047] [0.039] [0.039]
0.394*** 0.343*** 0.339*** 0.331*** 0.324*** 0.381*** 0.381***
[0.063] [0.062] [0.062] [0.058] [0.057] [0.045] [0.045]
0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.007** 0.014*** 0.014***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.030*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
-0.029
[0.035]
5.821*** 5.642*** 4.948*** 4.989*** 4.959*** 4.633*** 4.568*** 4.570***
[0.048] [0.048] [0.123] [0.125] [0.133] [0.139] [0.205] [0.205]
3,946
0.003
0.0014
3,946 3,946 3,946
0.129 0.154 0.155
0.13 0.15 0.15
3,946
0.300
0.30
3,946
0.325
0.32
3,946
0.505
0.50
3,946
0.505
0.50
Table 12:
(Own illustration;
Regression Output Manhattan 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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BRONX 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.006 -0.011 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.01 1 0.007 0.007
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
0.020 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.014 0.007 0.007
[0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.0171 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
0.058*** 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.010 0.022 0.022
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
0.131*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.041** 0.035** 0.035**
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
0.187*** 0.095*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.055***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
0.210*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 0.033* 0.033*
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
0.265*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.028 0.028
[0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019]
0.296*** 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.130*** 0.120*** 0.041** 0.041**
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
0.335*** 0.182*** 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.036 0.036
[0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
0.318*** 0.171*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.138*** 0.128*** -0.027 -0.026
[0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
0.381*** 0.225*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.066** 0.066**
[0.032] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
0.295*** 0.171*** 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.030 0.030
[0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
0.302*** 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.105*** 0.092*** 0.028 0.029
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
0.325*** 0.163*** 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.138*** 0.120*** 0.085*** 0.086***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
0.397*** 0.210*** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.185*** 0.175*** 0.060*** 0.062***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.022] [0.023]
0.536*** 0.534*** 0.468*** 0.498*** 0.487*** 0.392*** 0.392***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.017] [0.025] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022]
0.351*** 0.356*** 0.292*** 0.326*** 0.314*** 0.258*** 0.258***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.017] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021] [0.021]
0.173*** 0.187*** 0.126*** 0.164*** 0.149*** 0.118*** 0.118***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.017] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021] [0.021]
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.003*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
0.114*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.102***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
-0.002
[0.006]
5.015*** 4.768*** 4.733*** 4.807*** 4.747*** 4.661*** 4.937 4.950
[0.018] [0.019] [0.021] [0.026] [0.034] [0.034] [274.632] [421.049]
39,107
0.055
0.055
39,107
0.153
0.15
39,107
0.156
0.16
39,107
0.164
0.16
39,107
0.249
0.25
39,107
0.292
0.29
39,107
0.333
0.33
39,107
0.333
0.33
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Table 13: Regression Output Bronx 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BRONX 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.029 -0.032 -0.031 -0.027 -0.046 -0.048 -0.039 -0.039
[0.042] [0.0421 [0.042] [0.042] [0.039] 10.0391 [0.037] [0.037]
-0.026 -0.032 -0.030 -0.028 -0.037 -0.037 -0.025 -0.025
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.0411 [0.038] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036]
-0.029 -0.036 -0.036 -0.035 -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036
[0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.040] [0.038] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036]
0.018 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.018 -0.026 -0.025
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.038] 10.038] [0.037] [0.037]
0.063 0.044 0.034 0.034 0.022 0.019 0.006 0.006
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.039] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037]
0.100** 0.057 0.041 0.042 0.036 0.029 0.004 0.004
[0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.0401 [0.039] [0.038] [0.038]
0.149*** 0.096** 0.083* 0.084* 0.071* 0.067* 0.014 0.015
[0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.041] 10.040] [0.041] [0.041]
0.142*** 0.099** 0.081* 0.087* 0.083* 0.073* -0.006 -0.005
[0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.044] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
0.228*** 0.170*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.017 0.017
[0.050] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.046] 10.046] [0.047] [0.047]
0.189*** 0.141*** 0.124** 0.125** 0.11I** 0.107** -0.056 -0.056
[0.056] [0.054] [0.055] [0.054] [0.051] [0.0511 [0.052] [0.0531
0.251*** 0.174*** 0.152** 0.169*** 0.208*** 0.172*** 0.046 0.046
[0.060] [0.0601 [0.060] [0.059] [0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.066]
0.188*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 0.085 0.072 -0.007 -0.007
[0.055] [0.054] [0.054] [0.054] [0.057] [0.056] [0.057] [0.057]
0.139*** 0.087* 0.058 0.059 0.054 0.044 -0.017 -0.017
[0.052] [0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.049] 10.049] [0.051] [0.051]
0.123** 0.049 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.002 -0.011 -0.012
[0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.050] 10.050] [0.053] [0.053]
0.226*** 0.140*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.007 0.006
[0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.040] [0.040] [0.049] [0.049]
0.181*** 0.179*** 0.148*** 0.252*** 0.232*** 0.160*** 0.159***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
0.015 0.007 -0.023 0.087*** 0.065** 0.031 0.031
[0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026]
-0.155*** -0.167*** -0.196*** -0.080*** -0.103*** -0.116*** -0.116***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.030] [0.0291 [0.028] [0.028]
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002** -0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.002*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
[0.000] [0.004] 10.004] [0.003] [0.003]
0.098*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.091***
[0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
0.001
[0.013]
5.230*** 5.219*** 5.296*** 5.329*** 5.197*** 5.085*** 4.900*** 4.891***
[0.038] [0.040] [0.048] [0.049] [0.053] 10.054] [0.060] [0.122]
10,946
0.028
0.026
10,946
0.067
0.066
10,946
0.071
0.069
10,946
0.075
0.073
10,946
0.159
0.16
10,946
0.190
0.19
10,946
0.234
0.23
10,946
0.234
0.23
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Table 14: Regression Output Bronx 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BRONX 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
-0.058 -0.053 -0.046 -0.042 -0.020 -0.026 -0.002 -0.003
[0.036] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
-0.034 -0.054* -0.050 -0.048 -0.035 -0.042 -0.026 -0.026
[0.0351 [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029]
0.013 -0.028 -0.028 -0.028 -0.020 -0.025 -0.012 -0.013
[0.035] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
0.106*** 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.012 0.011
[0.035] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
0.190*** 0.081** 0.070** 0.068** 0.070** 0.063** 0.049 0.048
[0.0361 [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
0.217*** 0.091*** 0.076** 0.075** 0.077** 0.069** 0.037 0.035
[0.037] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032]
0.296*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.025 0.024
[0.038] [0.035] [0.035] [0.0341 [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
0.322*** 0.148*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 0.042 0.041
[0.041] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035]
0.396*** 0.202*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.042 0.043
[0.044] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.037] [0.036] [0.038] [0.038]
0.376*** 0.175*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.142*** -0.034 -0.032
[0.052] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046]
0.388*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.043 0.045
[0.059] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.054] [0.054] [0.055] [0.055]
0.319*** 0.165*** 0.140** 0.141** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.022 0.023
[0.060] [0.054] [0.055] [0.055] [0.052] [0.051] [0.053] [0.053]
0.291*** 0.076 0.040 0.039 0.046 0.036 -0.037 -0.036
[0.050] [0.048] [0.048] [0.048] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.048]
0.322*** 0.134*** 0.099** 0.096** 0.107** 0.100** 0.059 0.061
[0.051] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.047]
0.438*** 0.214*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.038 0.044
[0.036] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.031] [0.031] [0.040] [0.041]
0.607*** 0.598*** 0.567*** 0.595*** 0.596*** 0.469*** 0.469***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.030] [0.030] [0.027] [0.027]
0.368*** 0.363*** 0.332*** 0.369*** 0.369*** 0.294*** 0.295***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.020] [0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.026]
0.165*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.134*** 0.134***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.022] [0.030] [0.030] [0.026] [0.027]
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.0001
-0.001** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
0.138*** 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.127***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023]
-0.009
[0.011]
4.883*** 4.627*** 4.670*** 4.704*** 4.617*** 4.597*** 5.532*** 5.616***
[0.032] [0.031] [0.035] [0.038] [0.045] [0.048] [0.105] [0.147]
10,838
0.089
0.088
10,838
0.225
0.22
10,838
0.233
0.23
10,838
0.235
0.23
10,838
0.321
0.32
10,838
0.327
0.32
10,838
0.380
0.38
10,838
0.380
0.38
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Table 15: Regression Output Bronx 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BRONX 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
0.013 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.040* 0.040*
[0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.0231 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
0.053** 0.006 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.037* 0.037*
[0.026] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
0.113*** 0.056** 0.062** 0.054** 0.054** 0.051** 0.069*** 0.069***
[0.027] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.0231 [0.023] [0.022] [0.022]
0.196*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.080***
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.0241 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
0.232*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.087*** 0.087***
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
0.249*** 0.102*** 0.101** * 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.047* 0.047*
[0.029] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025]
0.299*** 0.131*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.035 0.035
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
0.350*** 0.181*** 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.071 ** 0.071**
[0.033] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
0.333*** 0.159*** 0.147*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.041 0.041
[0.039] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.036]
0.331*** 0.161*** 0.147*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 0.124*** -0.009 -0.009
[0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.039]
0.432*** 0.259*** 0.249*** 0.235*** 0.227*** 0.229*** 0.097** 0.097**
[0.046] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040]
0.311*** 0.155*** 0.150** * 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.071* 0.071*
[0.042] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.038] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037]
0.384*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.094*** 0.094***
[0.039] [0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036]
0.419*** 0.234*** 0.232*** 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.204*** 0.160*** 0.160***
[0.037] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035]
0.451*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.108*** 0.108***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.031] [0.031]
0.699*** 0.702*** 0.567*** 0.561*** 0.564*** 0.479*** 0.479***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
0.533*** 0.555*** 0.424*** 0.418*** 0.422*** 0.367*** 0.367***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
0.360*** 0.409*** 0.283*** 0.277*** 0.274*** 0.245*** 0.245***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020]
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.006*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
0.094*** 0.092*** 0.083*** 0.083***
[0.033] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029]
0.000
[0.008]
4.989*** 4.603*** 4.478*** 4.638*** 4.622*** 4.497*** 5.068*** 5.066***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.031] [0.038] [0.039] [0.170] [0.188]
17,323
0.065
0.064
17,323
0.218
0.22
17,323
0.227
0.23
17,323
0.248
0.25
17,323
0.298
0.30
17,323
0.322
0.32
17,323
0.366
0.36
17,323
0.366
0.36
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Table 16: Regression Output Bronx 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BROOKLYN 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
0.024* 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.021* 0.024** 0.024**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.0121 [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.052*** 0.029** 0.031** 0.031** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
0.080*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.048***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
0.093*** 0.044*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.039*** 0.036***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
0.137*** 0.064*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.056*** 0.052***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
0.134*** 0.028* 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.054***
[0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
0.159*** 0.011 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.037** 0.052*** 0.046***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
0.153*** -0.027* 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.019 0.064*** 0.054***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
0.093*** -0.084*** 0.007 0.004 -0.008 -0.038** 0.040*** 0.030*
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.015] [0.015]
0.038** -0.105*** -0.020 -0.024 -0.017 -0.051*** 0.006 -0.003
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
0.054*** -0.132*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.047*** -0.082*** -0.034** -0.047***
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
0.079*** -0.119*** -0.027 -0.030* -0.022 -0.059*** 0.011 -0.006
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017]
0.101 *** -0.088*** 0.011 0.007 0.015 -0.046** 0.030 0.008
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020]
0.056*** -0.151*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.049** -0.092*** -0.019 -0.044**
[0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
0.195*** -0.029** 0.085*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.042*** 0.003 -0.031*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.018] [0.018]
0.588*** 0.570*** 0.520*** 0.514*** 0.508*** 0.497*** 0.495***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.013] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
0.308*** 0.292*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.255*** 0.286*** 0.285***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.016] [0.014] [0.009] [0.009]
0.139*** 0.140*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.152*** 0.151 ***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.018] [0.016] [0.010] [0.010]
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.007*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
0.054 0.049 0.037 0.037
[0.034] [0.031] [0.023] [0.023]
0.035***
[0.005]
5.441*** 5.201*** 4.936*** 5.014*** 4.988*** 4.764*** 5.311*** 5.247***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.015] [0.016] [0.042] [0.032] [0.200] [0.203]
110,206
0.005
0.0049
110,206
0.075
0.075
110,206
0.096
0.096
110,206
0.102
0.10
110,206
0.152
0.15
110,206
0.225
0.22
110,206
0.374
0.37
110,206
0.375
0.37
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Table 17: Regression Output Brooklyn 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.0 5 , * p<0.1)
BROOKLYN 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I1
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 0.010 0.010
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.022] [0.022]
0.012 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.021] [0.021]
0.033 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.018 0.019 0.006 0.006
[0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.022] [0.022]
0.048* 0.014 0.023 0.023 0.030 0.031 0.000 0.000
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023] [0.023]
0.045 -0.004 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.030 -0.002 -0.002
[0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023]
-0.011 -0.083*** -0.037 -0.038 -0.031 -0.038 -0.000 0.000
[0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.027] [0.027]
-0.046 -0.151*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.074** -0.083*** -0.003 -0.003
[0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.028]
-0.097*** -0.218*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.125*** -0.134*** 0.017 0.018
[0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.028] [0.028]
-0.194*** -0.323*** -0.232*** -0.231*** -0.252*** -0.263*** -0.059* -0.058*
[0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.033] [0.033]
-0.282*** -0.381*** -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.282*** -0.297*** -0.130*** -0.129***
[0.039] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.034] [0.034]
-0.276*** -0.399*** -0.311*** -0.309*** -0.292*** -0.297*** -0.106*** -0.105***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038]
-0.231*** -0.368*** -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.260*** -0.272*** -0.083** -0.082**
[0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035]
-0.208*** -0.339*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.214*** -0.225*** -0.034 -0.032
[0.041] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.041]
-0.255*** -0.401*** -0.302*** -0.303*** -0.292*** -0.308*** -0.131*** -0.129***
[0.044] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
-0.146*** -0.307*** -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.178*** -0.188*** -0.129*** -0.126***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.036] [0.037]
0.383*** 0.361*** 0.338*** 0.328*** 0.317*** 0.400*** 0.400***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.023] [0.023] [0.019] [0.019]
0.141*** 0.112*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.194*** 0.194***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.024] [0.023] [0.018] [0.018]
0.025 -0.004 -0.024 -0.024 -0.028 0.053*** 0.053***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.026] [0.026] [0.019] [0.019]
-0.002** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.003*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
0.027 0.026 0.019* 0.019*
[0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.011]
-0.003
[0.010]
5.884*** 5.761*** 5.579*** 5.617*** 5.604*** 5.769*** 6.849*** 6.851***
[0.024] [0.027] [0.037] [0.038] [0.058] [0.063] [0.552] [0.553]
27,505
0.014
0.014
27,505
0.049
0.048
27,505
0.067
0.067
27,505
0.068
0.068
27,505
0.103
0.10
27,505
0.119
0.12
27,505
0.343
0.34
27,505
0.343
0.34
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Table 18: Regression Output Brooklyn 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
BROOKLYN 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (I000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
0.019 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.027 0.012 0.011
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017]
0.045** 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.047** 0.048** 0.046*** 0.045***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
0.084*** 0.049** 0.053** 0.052** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.060***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.017]
0.099*** 0.046** 0.051** 0.051** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.048*** 0.044**
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018]
0.175*** 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.130*** 0.090*** 0.085***
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
0.142*** 0.030 0.052** 0.053** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.075*** 0.068***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022]
0.189*** 0.029 0.055** 0.052** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.058**
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023]
0.215*** 0.014 0.053* 0.049* 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.108*** 0.093***
[0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
0.139*** -0.036 0.019 0.015 0.057** 0.055** 0.088*** 0.073***
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025]
0.055* -0.092*** -0.046 -0.050* -0.006 -0.011 0.040 0.027
[0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
0.057* -0.139*** -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.052* -0.062** -0.035 -0.055*
[0.032] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029]
0.090*** -0.134*** -0.068** -0.073** -0.015 -0.019 0.036 0.013
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029]
0.130*** -0.088** -0.036 -0.041 0.001 -0.010 0.076** 0.044
[0.036] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
0.038 -0.193*** -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.075** -0.076** -0.012 -0.045
[0.039] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.035] [0.035] [0.038] [0.038]
0.246*** -0.001 0.062*** 0.058** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.063** 0.016
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.021] [0.021] [0.030] [0.031]
0.580*** 0.570*** 0.536*** 0.546*** 0.550*** 0.497*** 0.494***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.031] [0.031] [0.027] [0.027]
0.263*** 0.255*** 0.223*** 0.269*** 0.273*** 0.270*** 0.268***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.028] [0.028] [0.023] [0.023]
0.078*** 0.080*** 0.051*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.121***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.027] [0.026] [0.020] [0.020]
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.005*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.028***
[0.001] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
0.216*** 0.211*** 0.149*** 0.149***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.026] [0.026]
0.047***
[0.008]
5.333*** 5.129*** 4.926*** 4.984*** 4.769*** 4.701*** 5.537*** 5.527***
[0.020] [0.022] [0.029] [0.0301 [0.056] [0.055] [0.231] [0.231]
35,639
0.008
0.0079
35,639
0.079
0.079
35,639
0.086
0.085
35,639
0.088
0.088
35,639
0.256
0.26
35,639
0.267
0.27
35,639
0.438
0.44
35,639
0.439
0.44
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Table 19: Regression Output Brooklyn 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 , * p<0.1)
BROOKLYN 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
0.048*** 0.034** 0.035** 0.034** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.060*** 0.060***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
0.080*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.070***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.0151 [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
0.097*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.076***
[0.0171 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.0161 [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
0.118*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.070***
[0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.015]
0.159*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.078*** 0.074***
[0.0181 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
0.207*** 0.093*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.091***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.0181 [0.018] [0.017]
0.233*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.090*** 0.082***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019]
0.243*** 0.054*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.075*** 0.064***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020]
0.215*** 0.021 0.056*** 0.049** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.086*** 0.073***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.020] [0.020]
0.203*** 0.044** 0.068*** 0.060*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.059*** 0.048**
[0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020]
0.226*** 0.023 0.037* 0.029 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.025 0.010
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
0.240*** 0.036 0.049** 0.042* 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.038* 0.017
[0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022]
0.228*** 0.035 0.066*** 0.060** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.060** 0.033
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
0.227*** 0.015 0.043* 0.034 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.037 0.007
[0.027] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.026]
0.342*** 0.111*** 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.028 -0.014
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.023] [0.023]
0.678*** 0.686*** 0.612*** 0.623*** 0.623*** 0.571*** 0.568***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
0.427*** 0.449*** 0.380*** 0.406*** 0.406*** 0.377*** 0.375***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.018] [0.017] [0.015] [0.015]
0.259*** 0.321*** 0.256*** 0.285*** 0.282*** 0.270*** 0.269***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014]
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.009*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.033***
[0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
0.319*** 0.313*** 0.263*** 0.263***
[0.083] [0.082] [0.076] [0.076]
0.043***
[0.006]
5.271*** 4.943*** 4.631*** 4.742*** 4.595*** 4.476*** 4.727*** 4.714***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.019] [0.020] [0.041] [0.034] [0.123] [0.123]
47,062
0.019
0.019
47,062
0.132
0.13
47,062
0.154
0.15
47,062
0.170
0.17
47,062
0.334
0.33
47,062
0.344
0.34
47,062
0.402
0.40
47,062
0.402
0.40
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Table 20: Regression Output Brooklyn 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
QUEENS 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (I 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.080*** -0.075*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.055*** -0.062*** 0.021 0.024
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 10.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
-0.042** -0.056*** -0.043** -0.047** -0.042** -0.049*** 0.030* 0.035**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
0.031 -0.012 -0.003 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017 0.036** 0.041**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 10.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
0.074*** 0.026 0.043** 0.040** 0.034* 0.025 0.060*** 0.066***
[0.0201 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017]
0.108*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.071***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
0.147*** 0.100*** 0.103*** 0.101 *** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.057*** 0.064***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018]
0.258*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.160*** 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.062*** 0.071***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
0.253*** 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.052*** 0.062***
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 10.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
0.279*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 0.119*** 0.050*** 0.061***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 10.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019]
0.283*** 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.151 *** 0.137*** 0.124*** 0.069*** 0.079***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
0.223*** 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.121*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.069*** 0.081***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
0.223*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.108*** 0.089*** 0.069*** 0.080***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
0.188*** 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.061*** 0.072***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020]
0.192*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.026 0.036*
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
0.239*** 0.126*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.123*** 0.108*** 0.045** 0.055***
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.019]
0.470*** 0.465*** 0.435*** 0.491*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.480***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
0.279*** 0.296*** 0.267*** 0.328*** 0.321*** 0.367*** 0.367***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023]
0.137*** 0.181*** 0.155*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.219***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022]
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.004*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.021***
[0.001] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
0. 150*** 0. 138*** 0. 116*** 0. 116***
[0.040] [0.038] [0.032] [0.032]
-0.019***
[0.006]
5.523*** 5.268*** 5.056*** 5.100*** 5.000*** 4.896*** 5.118*** 5.117***
[0.017] [0.019] [0.021] [0.024] [0.043] [0.037] [0.067] [0.067]
43,754
0.041
0.040
43,754
0.102
0.10
43,754
0.114
0.11
43,754
0.117
0.12
43,754
0.201
0.20
43,754
0.247
0.25
43,754
0.340
0.34
43,754
0.340
0.34
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Table 21: Regression Output Queens 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
QUEENS 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I I
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.104** -0.098** -0.092* -0.099** -0.087* -0.089* 0.053 0.059
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.0481 [0.048] [0.047] [0.042] [0.042]
-0.044 -0.049 -0.043 -0.049 -0.044 -0.045 0.101** 0.113***
[0.0471 [0.046] [0.046] [0.0461 [0.046] [0.045] [0.0411 [0.042]
0.001 -0.021 -0.019 -0.024 -0.036 -0.040 0.088** 0.097**
[0.047] [0.0471 [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.042] [0.042]
0.060 0.033 0.049 0.043 0.031 0.016 0.125*** 0.139***
[0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.042] [0.042]
0.092* 0.070 0.066 0.061 0.047 0.046 0.113*** 0.133***
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.043] [0.044]
0.143*** 0.112** 0.110** 0.104** 0.093** 0.089** 0.105** 0.121***
[0.047] [0.0461 [0.046] [0.046] [0.047] [0.045] [0.043] [0.043]
0.186*** 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 0.105** 0.102** 0.086* 0.106**
[0.047] [0.0471 [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.045] [0.045]
0.206*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.116** 0.I10** 0.087** 0.109**
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.044] [0.044]
0.236*** 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.155*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.100** 0.126***
[0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.044] [0.044]
0.225*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.118** 0.101** 0.081* 0.105**
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.047] [0.045] [0.046]
0.142*** 0.085 0.084 0.078 0.073 0.062 0.104** 0.131***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.051] [0.049] [0.047] [0.048]
0.207*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.120** 0.102** 0.139*** 0.165***
[0.050] [0.0501 [0.050] [0.0501 [0.050] [0.048] [0.0471 [0.048]
0.158*** 0.097** 0.101 ** 0.100* * 0.101** 0.087* 0.125*** 0.150***
[0.050] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.047] [0.048]
0.126** 0.057 0.056 0.051 0.044 0.037 0.070 0.095*
[0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.053] [0.052] [0.051] [0.049] [0.050]
0.204*** 0.142*** 0.151 *** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.125*** 0.097** 0.125***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [0.046]
0.218*** 0.203*** 0.181*** 0.284*** 0.268*** 0.417*** 0.418***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.045] [0.044] [0.042] [0.042]
0.051* 0.061** 0.039 0.142*** 0.128*** 0.287*** 0.288***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.045] [0.044] [0.040] [0.040]
-0.027 0.005 -0.015 0.085* 0.080* 0.154*** 0.155***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.046] [0.045] [0.041] [0.041]
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.003* -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.022** -0.022***
[0.002] [0.011] [0.0101 [0.008] [0.008]
0.1 12*** 0.110*** 0.086*** 0.086***
[0.043] [0.041] [0.032] [0.031]
-0.046***
[0.013]
5.759*** 5.683*** 5.426*** 5.465*** 5.339*** 5.301*** 5.432*** 5.432***
[0.041] [0.047] [0.055] [0.058] [0.086] [0.081] [0.116] [0.115]
10,847
0.028
0.027
10,847
0.051
0.049
10,847
0.059
0.058
10,847
0.061
0.059
10,847
0.144
0.14
10,847
0.180
0.18
10,847
0.365
0.36
10,847
0.366
0.36
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Table 22: Regression Output Queens 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
0.027 0.049 0.058
QUEENS 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I I
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (I 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.084** -0.082** -0.073** -0.076** -0.072** -0.075** -0.023 -0.017
[0.036] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.030] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028]
-0.044 -0.058* -0.053 -0.055* -0.062** -0.054* -0.012 0.001
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
0.028 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 -0.031 -0.026 0.001 0.011
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.030] [0.028] [0.028]
0.116*** 0.055* 0.062* 0.061* 0.044 0.044 0.034 0.048*
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
0.133*** 0.082** 0.083** 0.082** 0.059* 0.060** 0.058** 0.078***
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030]
0.185*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.051* 0.069**
[0.033] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029]
0.323*** 0.188*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.042 0.063**
[0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.031]
0.314*** 0.184*** 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.060* 0.083***
[0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.032]
0.309*** 0.145*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.032 0.060*
[0.033] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.029] [0.028] [0.030] [0.031]
0.335*** 0.171*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.080*** 0.105***
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
0.281*** 0.146*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.070** 0.098***
[0.037] [0.036] [0.036] 10.036] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035]
0.246*** 0.115*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.075** 0.069** 0.034 0.060*
[0.039] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036]
0.200*** 0.067** 0.063* 0.063* 0.052* 0.058* 0.036 0.060*
[0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.031] [0.030] [0.032] [0.033]
0.185*** 0.047 0.041 0.040 0.027 0.028 -0.011 0.012
[0.040] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.037]
0.268*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.015 0.042
[0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.027] [0.031] [0.033]
0.519*** 0.506*** 0.471*** 0.439*** 0.447*** 0.442*** 0.443***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.038] [0.038] [0.036] [0.036]
0.276*** 0.287*** 0.254*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 0.306*** 0.308***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.036] [0.035] [0.032] [0.032]
0.106*** 0.133*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.137*** 0.138***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.035] [0.034] [0.031] [0.031]
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.004*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.039***
[0.001] [0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011]
0.232*** 0.224*** 0.178*** 0.179***
[0.082] [0.080] [0.064] [0.065]
-0.045***
[0.016]
5.412*** 5.162*** 4.979*** 5.027*** 4.994*** 4.962*** 5.203*** 5.203***
[0.028] [0.030] [0.039] [0.040] [0.057] [0.052] [0.161] [0.160]
13,580
0.052
0.051
13,580
0.137
0.14
13,580
0.144
0.14
13,580
0.146
0.14
13,580
0.259
0.26
13,580
0.274
0.27
13,580
0.404
0.40
13,580
0.404
0.40
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Table 23: Regression Output Queens 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
QUEENS 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone I I
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
-0.077*** -0.076*** -0.054** -0.057** -0.046** -0.046** 0.008 0.007
[0.026] [0.025] [0.0251 [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
-0.067** -0.087*** -0.072*** -0.074*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.006 -0.009
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023]
0.031 -0.024 -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 0.012 0.009
[0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022]
0.039 -0.010 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.023 0.019
[0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023]
0.080*** 0.044* 0.049* 0.047* 0.029 0.033 0.017 0.012
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
0.114*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.013 0.009
[0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
0.231*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.044* 0.039
[0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.024] [0.025]
0.208*** 0.101*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.014 0.008
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
0.245*** 0.118*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.025 0.019
[0.026] [0.024] [0.024] 10.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
0.258*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.038 0.032
[0.027] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
0.204*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.080*** 0.087*** 0.035 0.028
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
0.190*** 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.063** 0.068** 0.028 0.022
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.029]
0.179*** 0.067** 0.066** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.031 0.026
[0.028] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027]
0.207*** 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.064** 0.073*** 0.010 0.005
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
0.208*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.012 0.006
[0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
0.559*** 0.560*** 0.525*** 0.604*** 0.604*** 0.555*** 0.556***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.039] [0.038] [0.033] [0.033]
0.398*** 0.424*** 0.392*** 0.469*** 0.471*** 0.462*** 0.462***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.036] [0.035] [0.031] [0.031]
0.251*** 0.303*** 0.274*** 0.341*** 0.343*** 0.317*** 0.317***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.021] [0.034] [0.033] [0.030] [0.030]
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.005** -0.032* -0.032* -0.029* -0.029*
[0.002] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
0.309*** 0.301*** 0.268*** 0.268***
[0.106] [0.105] [0.100] [0.100]
0.010
[0.009]
5.490*** 5.142*** 4.954*** 5.002*** 4.810*** 4.721*** 4.970*** 4.972***
[0.022] [0.025] [0.027] [0.032] [0.056] [0.054] [0.077] [0.077]
19,327
0.044
0.044
19,327
0.129
0.13
19,327
0.145
0.14
19,327
0.151
0.15
19,327
0.266
0.26
19,327
0.276
0.27
19,327
0.315
0.31
19,327
0.315
0.31
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Table 24: Regression Output Queens 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
STATEN ISLAND 2005-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
0.044 0.019 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.004
[0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.030] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026]
0.008 -0.013 -0.018 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.003
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
0.022 -0.006 -0.018 -0.013 -0.003 0.001 0.015 0.014
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
0.034 0.012 -0.009 -0.006 0.000 0.004 0.026 0.024
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.027] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
0.060** 0.027 -0.002 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.030 0.028
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
-0.003 -0.028 -0.044 -0.040 -0.038 -0.037 0.003 0.002
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
-0.016 -0.034 -0.050* -0.045 -0.036 -0.034 0.010 0.009
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
0.011 -0.019 -0.031 -0.029 -0.023 -0.022 -0.005 -0.007
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.023] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
0.002 -0.035 -0.051* -0.047* -0.035 -0.035 -0.016 -0.018
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
-0.014 -0.060** -0.065** -0.062** -0.040* -0.039* -0.019 -0.021
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.024] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
-0.011 -0.059** -0.060** -0.058** -0.036 -0.035 -0.014 -0.015
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
0.038 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 0.032 0.030
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
-0.005 -0.042 -0.051* -0.048 -0.039 -0.041* -0.012 -0.014
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
0.009 -0.032 -0.050* -0.048* -0.020 -0.021 0.016 0.017
[0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.028] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
-0.062** -0.096*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.001 0.005
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
0.523*** 0.528*** 0.381*** 0.573*** 0.573*** 0.506*** 0.506***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.055] [0.115] [0.107] [0.105] [0.105]
0.344*** 0.369*** 0.232*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.368*** 0.368***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.051] [0.104] [0.097] [0.096] [0.096]
0.101*** 0.144*** 0.012 0.235** 0.233*** 0.247*** 0.247***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.055] [0.092] [0.086] [0.088] [0.088]
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.017** -0.083** -0.077** -0.076** -0.076**
[0.008] [0.035] [0.032] [0.030] [0.030]
0.668*** 0.629*** 0.605*** 0.605***
[0.140] [0.133] [0.131] [0.131]
0.017***
[0.004]
5.474*** 5.040*** 4.889*** 5.072*** 4.687*** 4.670*** 4.719 4.627
[0.027] [0.038] [0.038] [0.074] [0.137] [0.129] [.] [134.746]
53,344
0.007
0.0066
53,344
0.047
0.047
53,344
0.081
0.081
53,344
0.095
0.094
53,344
0.287
0.29
53,344
0.327
0.33
53,344
0.358
0.36
53,344
0.358
0.36
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Table 25: Regression Output Staten Island 2005-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
STATEN ISLAND 2015-2018
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adj R2
-0.035 -0.056 -0.062 -0.056 -0.046 -0.063 -0.068 -0.069
[0.048] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050] [0.046] [0.045] [0.047] [0.047]
-0.069 -0.091* -0.100** -0.095* -0.074 -0.089** -0.074* -0.074*
[0.046] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.045] [0.045] [0.044] [0.044]
-0.103** -0.127*** -0.138*** -0.126*** -0.109** -0.112** -0.094** -0.094**
[0.045] [0.0471 [0.048] [0.047] [0.046] [0.044] [0.046] [0.046]
-0.073* -0.098** -0.113** -0.105** -0.092** -0.093** -0.061 -0.062
[0.043] [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.0431
-0.031 -0.066 -0.091** -0.076* -0.060 -0.076* -0.048 -0.048
[0.042] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.0431
-0.111*** -0.142*** -0.157*** -0.147*** -0.139*** -0.149*** -0.106** -0.107**
[0.043] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.0441 [0.043] [0.044] [0.044]
-0.110*** -0.125*** -0.136*** -0.125*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.071 -0.071
[0.042] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043]
-0.104** -0.133*** -0.150*** -0.143*** -0.123*** -0.134*** -0.107** -0.108**
[0.042] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.043] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044]
-0.113*** -0.153*** -0.177*** -0.168*** -0.148*** -0.155*** -0.132*** -0.133***
[0.043] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
-0.119*** -0.164*** -0.182*** -0.172*** -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.126*** -0.126***
[0.042] [0.045] [0.046] [0.045] [0.044] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
-0.129*** -0.176*** -0.186*** -0.178*** -0.147*** -0.153*** -0.133*** -0.134***
[0.043] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045]
-0.075* -0.120*** -0.133*** -0.125*** -0.106** -0.121*** -0.081* -0.082*
[0.044] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] [0.044] [0.043] [0.046] [0.046]
-0.110** -0.145*** -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.129*** -0.135*** -0.102** -0.103**
[0.046] [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.045] [0.045] [0.047] [0.047]
-0.137*** -0.176*** -0.203*** -0.196*** -0.155*** -0.168*** -0.119** -0.119**
[0.046] [0.048] [0.049] [0.048] [0.047] [0.046] [0.048] [0.048]
-0.167*** -0.203*** -0.212*** -0.205*** -0.167*** -0.180*** -0.126*** -0.125***
[0.039] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.046] [0.046]
0.535*** 0.495*** 0.333*** 0.648*** 0.632*** 0.572*** 0.572***
[0.060] [0.063] [0.076] [0.083] [0.080] [0.074] [0.074]
0.352*** 0.329*** 0.175** 0.473*** 0.455*** 0.419*** 0.419***
[0.061] [0.063] [0.074] [0.078] [0.076] [0.071] [0.071]
0.093 0.128 -0.022 0.302*** 0.291*** 0.306*** 0.305***
[0.077] [0.080] [0.088] [0.086] [0.085] [0.078] [0.078]
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.012* -0.049** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042**
[0.006] [0.024] [0.020] [0.017] [0.017]
0.423*** 0.384*** 0.353*** 0.353***
[0.126] [0.111] [0.102] [0.102]
0.003
[0.008]
5.687*** 5.241*** 5.188*** 5.367*** 4.880*** 4.574*** 4.756*** 4.739***
[0.039] [0.071] [0.075] [0.091] [0.108] [0.120] [0.111] [0.1151
15,574
0.007
0.0061
15,574
0.046
0.045
15,574
0.067
0.065
15,574
0.083
0.082
15,574
0.207
0.21
15,574
0.307
0.31
15,574
0.352
0.35
15,574
0.352
0.35
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Table 26: Regression Output Staten Island 2015-2018 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
STATEN ISLAND 2010-2014
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Adi R2
0.038 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005 0.018 0.023 0.017 0.017
[0.059] [0.061] [0.057] [0.056] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047]
0.025 -0.011 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.022 0.032 0.032
[0.053] [0.055] [0.051] [0.050] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
0.056 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.022 0.027 0.051 0.051
[0.052] [0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.042] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044]
0.052 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.012 0.018 0.058 0.057
[0.052] [0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.040] [0.040] [0.042] [0.042]
0.076 0.016 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.048 0.046
[0.051] [0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]
0.005 -0.050 -0.054 -0.052 -0.028 -0.021 0.047 0.046
[0.052] [0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.040] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
-0.038 -0.093* -0.095* -0.092* -0.058 -0.052 0.022 0.021
[0.052] [0.055] [0.051] [0.049] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
0.008 -0.051 -0.052 -0.049 -0.041 -0.035 0.003 0.002
[0.052] [0.055] [0.051] [0.050] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044]
0.010 -0.053 -0.052 -0.044 -0.018 -0.011 0.035 0.034
[0.052] [0.054] [0.051] [0.050] [0.041] [0.041] [0.043] [0.043]
-0.010 -0.089* -0.076 -0.073 -0.038 -0.032 0.012 0.010
[0.051] [0.054] [0.050] [0.049] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
-0.010 -0.092* -0.074 -0.075 -0.035 -0.029 0.013 0.012
[0.052] [0.055] [0.051] [0.050] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
0.057 -0.034 -0.011 -0.009 0.018 0.020 0.069 0.067
[0.052] [0.055] [0.051] [0.050] [0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043]
-0.005 -0.074 -0.069 -0.065 -0.039 -0.034 0.016 0.016
[0.056] [0.058] [0.055] [0.054] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045]
0.024 -0.043 -0.052 -0.050 -0.020 -0.014 0.040 0.040
[0.054] [0.056] [0.052] [0.051] [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
-0.074 -0.137*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.069 -0.062 0.006 0.015
[0.049] [0.052] [0.048] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.044]
0.574*** 0.578*** 0.401*** 0.315** 0.320** 0.232* 0.232*
[0.045] [0.044] [0.058] [0.127] [0.127] [0.119] [0.119]
0.338*** 0.365*** 0.204*** 0.141 0.147 0.081 0.082
[0.046] [0.045] [0.055] [0.112] [0.112] [0.105] [0.105]
0.014 0.087 -0.068 -0.033 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025
[0.067] [0.066] [0.072] [0.108] [0.108] [0.104] [0.104]
0.011*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.024*** -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.141*** -0.141***
[0.009] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
0.954*** 0.951*** 0.907*** 0.906***
[0.191] [0.191] [0.195] [0.195]
0.023***
[0.008]
5.399*** 4.959*** 4.771*** 5.001*** 4.885*** 4.854*** 5.494*** 5.227***
[0.049] [0.066] [0.064] [0.087] [0.186] [0.193] [0.237] [0.215]
14,976
0.012
0.011
14,976
0.077
0.076
14,976
0.119
0.12
14,976
0.128
0.13
14,976
0.404
0.40
14,976
0.407
0.41
14,976
0.456
0.45
14,976
0.456
0.45
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Table 27: Regression Output Staten Island 2010-2014 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
STATEN ISLAND 2005-2009
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6
Zone 7
Zone 8
Zone 9
Zone 10
Zone 11
Zone 12
Zone 13
Zone 14
Zone 15
Zone 16
One Family Home
Duplex
Triplex
Age
Age^2
Total Area (1 000sft)
Deal Size (MUSD)
Distance to ZC
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F Ad] R2
0.125*** 0.109** 0.091** 0.085* 0.056** 0.049* 0.045* 0.045*
[0.047] [0.047] [0.045] [0.045] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.0271
0.072 0.057 0.051 0.045 0.027 0.023 0.036 0.034
[0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
0.102** 0.086** 0.070* 0.062 0.035 0.031 0.051** 0.050*
[0.043] [0.043] [0.042] 10.041] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
0.104** 0.095** 0.067 0.060 0.038 0.035 0.056** 0.054**
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
0.124*** 0.106** 0.071* 0.061 0.029 0.023 0.042 0.040
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.026]
0.080* 0.070* 0.053 0.054 0.017 0.011 0.042* 0.041
[0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
0.070 0.064 0.044 0.037 0.030 0.026 0.060** 0.058**
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028]
0.104** 0.086** 0.075* 0.067 0.031 0.026 0.043 0.042
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.024] [0.024] [0.0271 [0.027]
0.083* 0.059 0.044 0.036 0.014 0.009 0.027 0.026
[0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027]
0.069 0.039 0.033 0.023 0.013 0.007 0.026 0.024
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026]
0.080* 0.047 0.044 0.035 0.015 0.011 0.039 0.038
[0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027]
0.115*** 0.080* 0.077* 0.069* 0.026 0.025 0.063** 0.061**
[0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.028]
0.069 0.045 0.036 0.033 0.001 -0.002 0.027 0.025
[0.045] [0.044] [0.043] [0.043] [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.029]
0. 110** 0.082* 0.068 0.053 0.044* 0.038 0.070** 0.071**
[0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028]
0.029 0.010 -0.011 -0.028 -0.006 -0.012 0.062** 0.070**
[0.041] [0.040] [0.039] [0.039] [0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.028]
0.474*** 0.504*** 0.184*** 0.027 0.038 0.012 0.012
[0.040] [0.042] [0.055] [0.066] [0.066] [0.063] [0.063]
0.337*** 0.382*** 0.092* -0.062 -0.051 -0.063 -0.063
[0.040] [0.042] [0.050] [0.063] [0.062] [0.059] [0.059]
0.138*** 0.168*** -0.104* -0.171*** -0.166*** -0.142** -0.142**
[0.050] [0.0521 [0.056] [0.060] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058]
0.009*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.051 *** -0.232*** -0.230*** -0.227*** -0.227***
[0.013] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
1.182*** 1.166*** 1.156*** 1.156***
[0.164] [0.164] [0.175] [0.175]
0.019***
[0.007]
5.366*** 4.956*** 4.805*** 5.246*** 5.264*** 5.241*** 5.974*** 5.863***
[0.041] [0.055] [0.056] [0.088] [0.099] [0.097] [0.484] [0.478]
22,794
0.006
0.0049
22,794
0.035
0.034
22,794
0.070
0.070
22.794
0.104
0.10
22,794
0.469
0.47
22,794
0.475
0.47
22,794
0.492
0.49
22,794
0.492
0.49
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Table 28: Regression Output Staten Island 2005-2009 - Distance Zones
(Own illustration; Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
